CVE-2026-41433: OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Privileged Java agent injection allows arbitrary host file overwrite via untrusted TMPDIR
Summary A flaw in the Java agent injection path allows a local attacker controlling a Java workload to overwrite arbitrary host files when Java injection is enabled and OBI is running with elevated privileges. The injector trusted TMPDIR from the target process and used unsafe file creation semantics, enabling both filesystem boundary escape and symlink-based file clobbering.
Published Apr 17, 2026 · Updated Apr 27, 2026
Affected packages
go.opentelemetry.io/obi
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 0.4.0, < 0.8.0
- Fixed in
- 0.8.0
- Check
go list -m go.opentelemetry.io/obi
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A flaw in the Java agent injection path allows a local attacker controlling a Java workload to overwrite arbitrary host files when Java injection is enabled and OBI is running with elevated privileges. The injector trusted TMPDIR from the target process and used unsafe file creation semantics, enabling both filesystem boundary escape and symlink-based file clobbering.
Remediation
Upgrade to https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/releases/tag/v0.8.0.
Details
The issue is in the Java agent staging logic in pkg/internal/java/java_inject.go.
The injector reads TMPDIR from the target process environment in findTempDir(...) and validates it with dirOK(...). In the vulnerable implementation, dirOK(...) used filepath.Join(root, dir), where root is /proc/<pid>/root. If dir is an absolute path, filepath.Join discards root, so values such as /etc or /proc/1/root/etc are resolved on the host instead of within the target process root.
That validated value is later reused in copyAgent(...) to build the destination path for the Java agent JAR. As a result, a malicious process can influence the privileged injector to write outside the intended /proc/<pid>/root boundary.
The file creation step further increases impact. The vulnerable code created the destination with os.OpenFile(..., os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0o644). Because this does not use exclusive creation or symlink protections, an attacker can pre-create a symlink at the chosen destination, for example in a writable temp directory, and cause the injector to truncate or overwrite another file writable by the privileged OBI process.
Relevant code paths:
pkg/internal/java/java_inject.go:findTempDir(...)pkg/internal/java/java_inject.go:dirOK(...)pkg/internal/java/java_inject.go:copyAgent(...)
In short, the vulnerability is caused by two issues acting together:
- Untrusted
TMPDIRfrom the target process can escape the intended target root. - The destination JAR is written with unsafe open semantics that allow clobbering via symlink or attacker-controlled destination selection.
PoC
Prerequisites:
- OBI is running with elevated privileges on the host.
- Java injection is enabled.
- The attacker can run or control a Java process on the same host.
Reproduction outline for the path escape case:
- Start a Java process with a controlled environment variable such as:
TMPDIR=/etc- or
TMPDIR=/proc/1/root/etc - Ensure the process is discovered by OBI and selected for Java agent injection.
- Wait for the injector to stage the agent JAR.
- Observe that the injector attempts to write
obi-java-agent.jaroutside/proc/<pid>/root, under the attacker-controlled host path.
Reproduction outline for the symlink clobber case:
- Start a Java process with
TMPDIR=/tmpor another writable temp directory. - Before injection occurs, create a symlink at the expected destination:
/tmp/obi-java-agent.jar -> /path/to/target/file- Trigger Java agent injection for that process.
- Observe that the privileged injector opens the symlink target with truncate semantics and overwrites the linked file contents.
Code evidence:
findTempDir(...)readsie.FileInfo.Service.EnvVars["TMPDIR"]dirOK(...)validates usingfilepath.Join(root, dir)copyAgent(...)writes the JAR into the selected temp directory- the vulnerable write uses
os.OpenFile(..., os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0o644)
Impact
This is an arbitrary file overwrite / file clobber vulnerability in a privileged host component.
Affected users are deployments where:
- Java injection is enabled
- OBI runs with elevated privileges
- untrusted local workloads can run Java processes on the same host
An attacker who can control a local Java process may be able to overwrite host files writable by OBI, which can lead to:
- host integrity compromise
- service disruption or denial of service
- possible local privilege escalation depending on deployment details and overwritten targets
The issue is local rather than remote, but the impact is high because the vulnerable component operates with elevated privileges on the host.
Credited to MrAlias, arminru.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-45676
OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Unsafe fastelf parsing allows malformed ELF to crash agent
medium5.5May 18, 2026CVE-2026-45678
OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Postgres BIND parsing can panic on malformed payloads
high7.5May 18, 2026CVE-2026-45679
OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Redis error text is exported in span status messages
medium6.5May 18, 2026CVE-2026-45680
OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Unbounded BPF internal metrics replay can exhaust CPU
medium5.9May 18, 2026CVE-2026-45681
OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: CPU-mismatch fallback uses 256-byte buffer with 8KB size
medium5.9May 18, 2026CVE-2026-45682
OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: CappedConcurrentHashMap leaks keys after removals
medium5.1May 18, 2026
