CVE-2026-41648: Incus has Unbounded YAML Metadata Decode via Parsing
Summary User provided image and backup tarballs would be unpacked and YAML files parsed without any size restrictions. This was making it easy for an authenticated user to provide a crafted image or backup tarball that when parsed by Incus would lead to a very large YAML document being loaded into memory, potentially causing the entire server to run out of memory.
Published May 4, 2026 · Updated May 8, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 6.23.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
User provided image and backup tarballs would be unpacked and YAML files parsed without any size restrictions. This was making it easy for an authenticated user to provide a crafted image or backup tarball that when parsed by Incus would lead to a very large YAML document being loaded into memory, potentially causing the entire server to run out of memory.
Details
It was found that getImageMetadata and backup.GetInfo call yaml.NewDecoder(tr).Decode() directly on the tar reader without limiting how many bytes the YAML decoder can consume. The tar entry hdr.Size is not checked before decoding.
A tar archive can be crafted in which metadata.yaml or backup/index.yaml declares a large size in the tar header, causing the YAML decoder to read and allocate proportional memory on the server. The gopkg.in/yaml.v2 library mitigates YAML alias and anchor bombs, such as “billion laughs,” through its built-in excessive-aliasing check. However, large flat YAML documents with many keys or long string values can still produce linear but amplified memory consumption of approximately 5x to 6x the input size.
A 200 MB tar entry for metadata.yaml may cause approximately 1.2 GB of heap allocations during decode, which may be sufficient to trigger an out-of-memory condition on a constrained daemon or significantly degrade service. Because the decode occurs in the daemon process, excessive garbage-collection pressure can affect concurrent operations. Appropriate API permissions are required to upload an image or backup archive.
Mitigating factors include the fact that the amplification is linear rather than exponential, at approximately 5x to 6x, and that upload bandwidth is the practical bottleneck for delivering large payloads.
Affected Files:
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/cmd/incusd/images.go#L1456
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/backup/backup_info.go#L87
- https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/backup/backup_info.go#L115
Image metadata parsing reads YAML directly from the tar stream: Affected Code:
if hdr.Name == "metadata.yaml" || hdr.Name == "./metadata.yaml" {
err = yaml.NewDecoder(tr).Decode(&result)Backup info parsing does the same:
Affected Code:
if hdr.Name == backupIndexPath {
err = yaml.NewDecoder(tr).Decode(&result)
if result.Config == nil && hdr.Name == "backup/container/backup.yaml" {
err = yaml.NewDecoder(tr).Decode(&result.Config)This was confirmed as follows:
Command:
go test ./test/fuzz -run='TestUnboundedYAMLMetadataDecode' -count=1 -vOutput:
=== RUN TestUnboundedYAMLMetadataDecode
image_metadata_poc_test.go:80: metadata.yaml size: 10.2 MB
image_metadata_poc_test.go:113: metadata.yaml hdr.Size = 10688940 bytes (10.2 MB) -- no size
check exists in getImageMetadata before yaml.NewDecoder(tr).Decode()
image_metadata_poc_test.go:124: decoded 50000 properties from 10.2 MB metadata.yaml
image_metadata_poc_test.go:125: yaml.NewDecoder(tr).Decode() accepted 10.2 MB metadata.yaml
with 50000 properties -- no hdr.Size check or io.LimitReader in images.go:1457 or
backup_info.go:88
--- FAIL: TestUnboundedYAMLMetadataDecode (0.11s)
FAILIt is recommended to add a size check on hdr.Size before YAML decoding and to wrap the tar reader in io.LimitReader.
Proposed Fix:
const maxMetadataSize = 1 << 20 // 1 MB
if hdr.Size > maxMetadataSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("metadata entry too large: %d bytes", hdr.Size)
}
err = yaml.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(tr, maxMetadataSize)).Decode(&result)A patch is available at https://github.com/lxc/incus/releases/tag/v7.0.0.
Credit
This issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)
Credited to raefko, Ectario, stgraber.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-35527
Incus has Blind SSRF via Image Import Preflight HEAD
medium4.3May 4, 2026CVE-2026-40195
Incus has a Nil-Pointer Dereference Panic via Bucket Metadata
high6.5May 4, 2026CVE-2026-40197
Incus has a Nil-Pointer Dereference via Custom Volume Import
high6.5May 4, 2026CVE-2026-40243
Incus has an OVN TLS Verification that Accepts Peer-Supplied Roots
low2.3May 4, 2026CVE-2026-40251
Incus Vulnerable to Panic via Snapshot Bounds Check
high6.5May 4, 2026CVE-2026-41647
Incus has Nil-Pointer Dereference via S3 Bucket Import
medium6.5No fixMay 4, 2026
