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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-42206: OpenID Connect nonce generated but never validated — ID token replay attack

mediumCVSS 4.0 5.7GHSA-3gx8-q682-38mx

Summary The roadiz/openid package generates an OIDC nonce in OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate() and includes it in the authorization request sent to the identity provider, but never stores it and never validates it on the callback.

Published Apr 29, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026

Affected packages

roadiz/openid

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
>= 2.7.0, < 2.7.18
Fixed in
2.7.18
Check
composer show roadiz/openid

roadiz/openid

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
>= 2.6.0, < 2.6.31
Fixed in
2.6.31
Check
composer show roadiz/openid

roadiz/openid

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
>= 2.5.0, < 2.5.45
Fixed in
2.5.45
Check
composer show roadiz/openid

roadiz/openid

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
< 2.3.43
Fixed in
2.3.43
Check
composer show roadiz/openid

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The roadiz/openid package generates an OIDC nonce in OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate() and includes it in the authorization request sent to the identity provider, but never stores it and never validates it on the callback. The OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory validation chain does not include a nonce constraint, and OpenIdAuthenticator::authenticate() never checks the nonce claim in the returned ID token against a stored value.

Details

In src/OAuth2LinkGenerator.php, a nonce is created and sent to the IdP:

'nonce' => $this->tokenGenerator->generateToken(),

However, this value is neither stored in session, cache, nor any other persistent store.

In src/OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory.php, the JWT validation constraints are:

  • LooseValidAt (expiry)
  • PermittedFor (audience)
  • IssuedBy (issuer)
  • HostedDomain (optional)
  • UserInfoEndpoint (optional)

No nonce constraint is present.

In src/Authentication/OpenIdAuthenticator.php, the authenticate() method validates the state CSRF token correctly (fixed in v2.7.10), but never retrieves a stored nonce or compares it against the nonce claim in the ID token.

PoC

  1. Obtain a valid ID token from a legitimate OIDC flow for a target user (e.g. via network interception, browser history leak, or referrer header exposure on a non-HTTPS redirect).
  2. Replay the ID token: Since the nonce in the token is never cross-checked against a client-stored value, the token passes all validation constraints as long as it has not expired.
  3. Result: An attacker can authenticate as the victim within the ID token's validity window.

Additionally, in an authorization code flow with multiple concurrent sessions, a malicious IdP or a compromised token endpoint could inject a token with a mismatched nonce, and the application would accept it silently.

Impact

  • ID token replay attacks: Valid but intercepted tokens can be reused for authentication within their validity period.
  • Token injection attacks: A malicious or compromised identity provider can inject tokens across sessions without detection.
  • Affects any Roadiz application using the roadiz/openid package with OpenID Connect SSO.

The OIDC Core 1.0 specification (Section 3.1.3.7) explicitly requires clients to verify the nonce claim if it was present in the authorization request.

Credited to athuljayaram.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology