CVE-2026-42223: Nginx-UI Settings API Exposes Protected Secrets
Summary The GetSettings API handler (api/settings/settings.go:24-65) serializes all settings structs to JSON and returns them to authenticated users. Many sensitive fields are tagged with protected:"true" - however, this tag is only enforced during writes (via ProtectedFill in SaveSettings) and is completely ignored during reads.
Published May 6, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.3.7
- Fixed in
- 2.3.8
- Check
go list -m github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The GetSettings API handler (api/settings/settings.go:24-65) serializes all settings structs to JSON and returns them to authenticated users. Many sensitive fields are tagged with protected:"true" - however, this tag is only enforced during writes (via ProtectedFill in SaveSettings) and is completely ignored during reads. This exposes 40+ protected fields including JwtSecret (enabling auth token forgery), NodeSecret (enabling cluster node impersonation), OIDC ClientSecret (enabling OAuth account takeover), and the IP whitelist configuration.
Details
Vulnerable Code
`api/settings/settings.go:49-64` - GetSettings serializes all fields
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"app": cSettings.AppSettings,
"server": cSettings.ServerSettings,
"database": settings.DatabaseSettings,
"auth": settings.AuthSettings,
"casdoor": settings.CasdoorSettings,
"oidc": settings.OIDCSettings,
"cert": settings.CertSettings,
"http": settings.HTTPSettings,
"logrotate": settings.LogrotateSettings,
"nginx": settings.NginxSettings,
"node": settings.NodeSettings,
"openai": settings.OpenAISettings,
"terminal": settings.TerminalSettings,
"webauthn": settings.WebAuthnSettings,
})Go's json.Marshal serializes all exported fields with json: tags. The protected:"true" struct tag is a custom tag - it has no effect on JSON serialization.
Protection is Write-Only
`api/settings/settings.go:126-135` - ProtectedFill only used during saves
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.AppSettings, &json.App)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.ServerSettings, &json.Server)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(settings.AuthSettings, &json.Auth)
// ... etcProtectedFill prevents overwriting protected fields during SaveSettings, but GetSettings has no corresponding filter. The protection is asymmetric - secrets can be read but not overwritten.
Exposed Protected Fields
`settings/node.go`:
Secret(protected) - used for cluster node authenticationSkipInstallation(protected),Demo(protected)
`settings/oidc.go` (all protected):
ClientId,ClientSecret,Endpoint,RedirectUri,Scopes,Identifier
`settings/casdoor.go` (all protected):
Endpoint,ExternalUrl,ClientId,ClientSecret,CertificatePath,Organization,Application,RedirectUri
`settings/auth.go`:
IPWhiteList(protected) - exposes security configuration
Attack Scenario
- Low-privilege authenticated user calls
GET /api/settings - Response includes
NodeSecret- attacker can impersonate cluster nodes - Response includes OIDC
ClientSecret- attacker can perform OAuth flows as the application - Response includes
IPWhiteList- attacker learns network security configuration - If
JwtSecretis in app settings (via cosy framework), attacker can forge authentication tokens for any user
PoC
1. `GetSettings` serializes all fields without filtering protected:"true" tags. From api/settings/settings.go:49-64:
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"app": cSettings.AppSettings,
"server": cSettings.ServerSettings,
"database": settings.DatabaseSettings,
"auth": settings.AuthSettings,
"casdoor": settings.CasdoorSettings,
"oidc": settings.OIDCSettings,
"cert": settings.CertSettings,
"http": settings.HTTPSettings,
"logrotate": settings.LogrotateSettings,
"nginx": settings.NginxSettings,
"node": settings.NodeSettings,
"openai": settings.OpenAISettings,
"terminal": settings.TerminalSettings,
"webauthn": settings.WebAuthnSettings,
})Go's json.Marshal serializes all exported fields. The custom protected:"true" tag has no effect on serialization.
2. Protected secrets are defined across settings/*.go. High-impact examples:
// settings/server_v1.go:19
JwtSecret string `json:"jwt_secret" protected:"true"`
// settings/node.go:5
Secret string `json:"secret" protected:"true"`
// settings/oidc.go
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret" protected:"true"`
// settings/auth.go
IPWhiteList []string `json:"ip_white_list" protected:"true"`3. `ProtectedFill` is write-only. It appears 10 times in SaveSettings (lines 126-135) but 0 times in GetSettings:
// api/settings/settings.go:126-135 - Only used during writes
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.AppSettings, &json.App)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.ServerSettings, &json.Server)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(settings.AuthSettings, &json.Auth)
// ... 7 more calls4. Exploit request. Any authenticated user can retrieve all secrets:
GET /api/settings HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer <any-valid-jwt>Response includes (among 45 protected fields):
{
"app": {"jwt_secret": "<the-actual-jwt-signing-key>", ...},
"node": {"secret": "<node-authentication-secret>", ...},
"oidc": {"client_secret": "<oidc-client-secret>", ...},
"casdoor": {"client_secret": "<casdoor-client-secret>", ...},
"auth": {"ip_white_list": ["10.0.0.1", ...], ...},
"nginx": {"reload_cmd": "nginx -s reload", "restart_cmd": "...", ...}
}Impact
- Authentication bypass via JwtSecret: An attacker who obtains the
JwtSecretcan forge valid JWT tokens for any user, including admin accounts. This provides permanent, independent access that survives password changes and session revocations. - Cluster compromise via NodeSecret: The
NodeSecretis used for inter-node authentication in nginx-ui clusters. An attacker can impersonate any cluster node, push malicious configurations to all nodes, and intercept cluster synchronization traffic. - Third-party OAuth takeover: Leaked OIDC
ClientSecretand CasdoorClientSecretallow the attacker to perform OAuth flows as the nginx-ui application, potentially gaining access to user accounts on the identity provider. - Security configuration disclosure: The
IPWhiteList,ReloadCmd,RestartCmd,ConfigDir,SbinPath, and other protected fields reveal the security posture and infrastructure layout, enabling more targeted attacks. - Low barrier to exploitation: Any authenticated user (not just admins) can access
GET /api/settings. In multi-user deployments, a low-privilege operator can escalate to full admin access.
Remediation
Filter out protected:"true" fields before serialization.
Credited to yotampe-pluto.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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