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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-42223: Nginx-UI Settings API Exposes Protected Secrets

mediumCVSS 3.1 6.5GHSA-q4w7-56hr-83rm

Summary The GetSettings API handler (api/settings/settings.go:24-65) serializes all settings structs to JSON and returns them to authenticated users. Many sensitive fields are tagged with protected:"true" - however, this tag is only enforced during writes (via ProtectedFill in SaveSettings) and is completely ignored during reads.

Published May 6, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 2.3.7
Fixed in
2.3.8
Check
go list -m github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The GetSettings API handler (api/settings/settings.go:24-65) serializes all settings structs to JSON and returns them to authenticated users. Many sensitive fields are tagged with protected:"true" - however, this tag is only enforced during writes (via ProtectedFill in SaveSettings) and is completely ignored during reads. This exposes 40+ protected fields including JwtSecret (enabling auth token forgery), NodeSecret (enabling cluster node impersonation), OIDC ClientSecret (enabling OAuth account takeover), and the IP whitelist configuration.

Details

Vulnerable Code

`api/settings/settings.go:49-64` - GetSettings serializes all fields

c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
    "app":       cSettings.AppSettings,
    "server":    cSettings.ServerSettings,
    "database":  settings.DatabaseSettings,
    "auth":      settings.AuthSettings,
    "casdoor":   settings.CasdoorSettings,
    "oidc":      settings.OIDCSettings,
    "cert":      settings.CertSettings,
    "http":      settings.HTTPSettings,
    "logrotate": settings.LogrotateSettings,
    "nginx":     settings.NginxSettings,
    "node":      settings.NodeSettings,
    "openai":    settings.OpenAISettings,
    "terminal":  settings.TerminalSettings,
    "webauthn":  settings.WebAuthnSettings,
})

Go's json.Marshal serializes all exported fields with json: tags. The protected:"true" struct tag is a custom tag - it has no effect on JSON serialization.

Protection is Write-Only

`api/settings/settings.go:126-135` - ProtectedFill only used during saves

cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.AppSettings, &json.App)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.ServerSettings, &json.Server)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(settings.AuthSettings, &json.Auth)
// ... etc

ProtectedFill prevents overwriting protected fields during SaveSettings, but GetSettings has no corresponding filter. The protection is asymmetric - secrets can be read but not overwritten.

Exposed Protected Fields

`settings/node.go`:

  • Secret (protected) - used for cluster node authentication
  • SkipInstallation (protected), Demo (protected)

`settings/oidc.go` (all protected):

  • ClientId, ClientSecret, Endpoint, RedirectUri, Scopes, Identifier

`settings/casdoor.go` (all protected):

  • Endpoint, ExternalUrl, ClientId, ClientSecret, CertificatePath, Organization, Application, RedirectUri

`settings/auth.go`:

  • IPWhiteList (protected) - exposes security configuration

Attack Scenario

  1. Low-privilege authenticated user calls GET /api/settings
  2. Response includes NodeSecret - attacker can impersonate cluster nodes
  3. Response includes OIDC ClientSecret - attacker can perform OAuth flows as the application
  4. Response includes IPWhiteList - attacker learns network security configuration
  5. If JwtSecret is in app settings (via cosy framework), attacker can forge authentication tokens for any user

PoC

1. `GetSettings` serializes all fields without filtering protected:"true" tags. From api/settings/settings.go:49-64:

c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
    "app":       cSettings.AppSettings,
    "server":    cSettings.ServerSettings,
    "database":  settings.DatabaseSettings,
    "auth":      settings.AuthSettings,
    "casdoor":   settings.CasdoorSettings,
    "oidc":      settings.OIDCSettings,
    "cert":      settings.CertSettings,
    "http":      settings.HTTPSettings,
    "logrotate": settings.LogrotateSettings,
    "nginx":     settings.NginxSettings,
    "node":      settings.NodeSettings,
    "openai":    settings.OpenAISettings,
    "terminal":  settings.TerminalSettings,
    "webauthn":  settings.WebAuthnSettings,
})

Go's json.Marshal serializes all exported fields. The custom protected:"true" tag has no effect on serialization.

2. Protected secrets are defined across settings/*.go. High-impact examples:

// settings/server_v1.go:19
JwtSecret string `json:"jwt_secret" protected:"true"`

// settings/node.go:5
Secret string `json:"secret" protected:"true"`

// settings/oidc.go
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret" protected:"true"`

// settings/auth.go
IPWhiteList []string `json:"ip_white_list" protected:"true"`

3. `ProtectedFill` is write-only. It appears 10 times in SaveSettings (lines 126-135) but 0 times in GetSettings:

// api/settings/settings.go:126-135 - Only used during writes
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.AppSettings, &json.App)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(cSettings.ServerSettings, &json.Server)
cSettings.ProtectedFill(settings.AuthSettings, &json.Auth)
// ... 7 more calls

4. Exploit request. Any authenticated user can retrieve all secrets:

GET /api/settings HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer <any-valid-jwt>

Response includes (among 45 protected fields):

{
  "app": {"jwt_secret": "<the-actual-jwt-signing-key>", ...},
  "node": {"secret": "<node-authentication-secret>", ...},
  "oidc": {"client_secret": "<oidc-client-secret>", ...},
  "casdoor": {"client_secret": "<casdoor-client-secret>", ...},
  "auth": {"ip_white_list": ["10.0.0.1", ...], ...},
  "nginx": {"reload_cmd": "nginx -s reload", "restart_cmd": "...", ...}
}

Impact

  • Authentication bypass via JwtSecret: An attacker who obtains the JwtSecret can forge valid JWT tokens for any user, including admin accounts. This provides permanent, independent access that survives password changes and session revocations.
  • Cluster compromise via NodeSecret: The NodeSecret is used for inter-node authentication in nginx-ui clusters. An attacker can impersonate any cluster node, push malicious configurations to all nodes, and intercept cluster synchronization traffic.
  • Third-party OAuth takeover: Leaked OIDC ClientSecret and Casdoor ClientSecret allow the attacker to perform OAuth flows as the nginx-ui application, potentially gaining access to user accounts on the identity provider.
  • Security configuration disclosure: The IPWhiteList, ReloadCmd, RestartCmd, ConfigDir, SbinPath, and other protected fields reveal the security posture and infrastructure layout, enabling more targeted attacks.
  • Low barrier to exploitation: Any authenticated user (not just admins) can access GET /api/settings. In multi-user deployments, a low-privilege operator can escalate to full admin access.

Remediation

Filter out protected:"true" fields before serialization.

Credited to yotampe-pluto.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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