CVE-2026-42526: Apache Airflow Amazon provider: Prevent unauthorized access to team-scoped secrets in AWS Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store backends
In the AWS Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store secrets backends of apache-airflow-providers-amazon prior to 9.28.0, the team-scoping logic could resolve a connid containing a / (e.g. "myteam/conn") to the same path as another team's team-scoped secret when the caller had no team context. A privileged caller without team context could therefore retrieve another team's secret by crafting a colliding connid.
Published May 19, 2026 · Updated Jun 5, 2026
Affected packages
apache-airflow-providers-amazon
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 9.28.0
- Fixed in
- 9.28.0
- Check
pip show apache-airflow-providers-amazon
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
In the AWS Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store secrets backends of apache-airflow-providers-amazon prior to 9.28.0, the team-scoping logic could resolve a conn_id containing a / (e.g. "my_team/conn") to the same path as another team's team-scoped secret when the caller had no team context. A privileged caller without team context could therefore retrieve another team's secret by crafting a colliding conn_id. Fixed in 9.28.0 by switching the team-scope separator to -- and rejecting team-shaped conn_ids when team context is absent. Affects the experimental multi-tenant teams feature only. Users are recommended to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-amazon 9.28.0, which fixes the issue.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
