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AI agent vulnerability · Flowise

CVE-2026-42861: FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Variable Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace Resource Reassignment

highCVSS 4.0 7.6GHSA-6fw7-3q8r-m5vj

Flowise 3.1.1 and earlier accept server-controlled fields in PUT /api/v1/variables/{variableId}. A logged-in user can set workspaceId and move a variable into a different workspace, which breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace setups. Fixed in flowise 3.1.2.

Published May 14, 2026 · Updated Jun 9, 2026 · Analysis Oct 27, 2026

What an attacker can do

The variable update endpoint merges the JSON request body straight into the database entity. There is no DTO allowlist and no ownership check. A caller can therefore send workspaceId, createdDate and updatedDate along with the normal name, value and type fields, and the server stores them. This is mass assignment (CWE-915) with an authorization gap (CWE-284, CWE-639).

In the researcher's proof of concept, a PUT with a made-up workspaceId came back with that workspaceId persisted. The attacker needs a valid login and the ID of a variable they can update. In a multi-tenant Flowise deployment, they can push a variable into another workspace, or pull in one by targeting it from their side. Variables in Flowise often hold values that flows use at run time, so moving or planting one can change how another team's flows behave. The advisory calls the tenant isolation bypass "potential" and lists reassignment and metadata edits as the confirmed effects. Single-workspace instances have little exposure.

Who is affected

The npm package flowise at 3.1.1 and earlier. The risk is limited to deployments with more than one workspace and users who should not see each other's resources. Check the version:

npm ls flowise

For Docker installs, check the image tag you run.

flowise

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 3.1.1
Fixed in
3.1.2
Check
npm ls flowise

How to fix it

Upgrade to flowise 3.1.2:

npm install -g [email protected]

The 3.1.2 release notes list several access-control fixes, including mass assignment and IDOR fixes. The sources give no workaround. Until you upgrade, limit accounts on shared instances.

How to tell if you were hit

Look in the Flowise database for variables whose workspaceId differs from where they were created, or whose createdDate is in the past while the record is new. Check access logs for PUT /api/v1/variables/ requests with large bodies from users who do not normally edit variables. Compare variables in each workspace against what its owners expect.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

A Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the variable update endpoint of FlowiseAI.

The endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a variable resource.

Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign variables to arbitrary workspaces.

This behavior may break tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments.

Details

The endpoint responsible for updating variables:

PUT /api/v1/variables/{variableId}

accepts a JSON request body containing the variable definition.

However, the backend does not restrict which attributes can be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include internal properties that should normally be controlled exclusively by the server.

Server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:

  • workspaceId
  • createdDate
  • updatedDate

These fields appear to be directly mapped to the database entity without strict input validation or authorization checks.

For example, the following request body was accepted by the server:

{
  "name": "aaa",
  "value": "bbbe",
  "type": "static",
  "createdDate": "2016-03-06T17:59:30.000Z",
  "updatedDate": "2016-03-06T18:00:17.000Z",
  "workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}

The server accepted the attacker-controlled workspaceId and metadata fields and persisted them.

PoC

Request

PUT /api/v1/variables/<VARIABLE_ID>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "name": "aaa",
  "value": "bbbe",
  "type": "static",
  "createdDate": "2016-03-06T17:59:30.000Z",
  "updatedDate": "2016-03-06T18:00:17.000Z",
  "workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}

Response

{
  "id": "0a2b9f61-4a97-4ff8-b80d-00275ed18674",
  "name": "aaa",
  "value": "bbbe",
  "type": "static",
  "createdDate": "2016-03-06T17:59:30.000Z",
  "updatedDate": "2026-03-06T18:05:17.000Z",
  "workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}

This confirms that the backend accepts and persists attacker-controlled internal properties.

Impact

This vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate internal attributes of variable resources.

Possible impacts include:

  1. Cross-workspace reassignment of variables (workspaceId)
  2. Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)
  3. Potential tenant isolation bypass in multi-workspace deployments

In multi-tenant environments, this may allow an attacker to move variables between workspaces without authorization.

Credited to berkdedekarginoglu.

Questions

Does CVE-2026-42861 work without logging in?

No. The attacker must be an authenticated Flowise user. The CVSS 4.0 vector requires low privileges and rates attack complexity as high.

Which fields can a caller overwrite?

workspaceId, createdDate and updatedDate, according to the advisory. The workspaceId change is the one that matters for tenant isolation.

Is a single-workspace Flowise affected?

The code is vulnerable, but the harm is cross-workspace reassignment, so the practical risk is on multi-workspace deployments. Upgrade to 3.1.2 anyway.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

More Flowise vulnerabilities

All Flowise entries