CVE-2026-43980: malla: Stored XSS via Meshtastic node names in multiple frontend pages
Node names (longname, shortname) received via MQTT are stored in SQLite without sanitization and rendered into the DOM without escaping. Any participant on a public Meshtastic MQTT broker can set a malicious node name that executes JavaScript in the browser of every Malla dashboard visitor.
Published Jun 3, 2026
Affected packages
malla
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.1.7
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
pip show malla
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Node names (long_name, short_name) received via MQTT are stored in SQLite without sanitization and rendered into the DOM without escaping. Any participant on a public Meshtastic MQTT broker can set a malicious node name that executes JavaScript in the browser of every Malla dashboard visitor.
Affected files:
- src/malla/templates/traceroute_graph.html (line ~832)
- src/malla/templates/map.html (lines ~945, 1078)
- src/malla/templates/packet_detail.html (lines ~1402, 1452)
- src/malla/static/js/relay_node_analysis.js (line ~124)
Steps to reproduce
- Publish a Meshtastic NODEINFO_APP packet to any public MQTT broker with long_name set to a HTML entity i.e ``
- Wait for malla-capture to store it
- Open the dashboard
Impact
Allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the browser, such as:
- Phishing overlays
- Force redirect to malicious websites
- Injection of arbitrary third-party scripts (no CSP restrictions)
- Browser resource abuse
- Persistent dashboard denial of service
Credited to tiagoabreu22.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
