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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-44328: free5GC's SMF UPI DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{ref} panics on AN-node deletion via nil UPF dereference; unauthenticated, state-mutating

highCVSS 3.1 8.2GHSA-p9mg-74mg-cwwr

Summary free5GC's SMF mounts the UPI management route group without inbound OAuth2 middleware (same root cause as the broader UPI auth gap reported in free5gc/free5gc#887). On top of that, the DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{upNodeRef} handler unconditionally dereferences upNode.UPF after the type-guarded async release, even though AN-typed nodes are constructed without a UPF object.

Published May 8, 2026 · Updated Jun 8, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/free5gc/smf

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 1.4.3
Fixed in
1.4.3
Check
go list -m github.com/free5gc/smf

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

free5GC's SMF mounts the UPI management route group without inbound OAuth2 middleware (same root cause as the broader UPI auth gap reported in free5gc/free5gc#887). On top of that, the DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{upNodeRef} handler unconditionally dereferences upNode.UPF after the type-guarded async release, even though AN-typed nodes are constructed without a UPF object. As a result, a single unauthenticated DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1 request crashes the handler with a nil-pointer panic AND mutates the in-memory user-plane topology before panicking (the UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) line runs first). This is an unauthenticated, state-mutating panic-DoS sink that an off-path network attacker can trigger by name against any AN entry.

Details

Validated against the SMF container in the official Docker compose lab.

  • Source repo tag: v4.2.1
  • Running Docker image: free5gc/smf:v4.2.1
  • Runtime SMF commit: 8385c00a
  • Docker validation date: 2026-03-22 local (container log timestamp 2026-03-21T23:43:17Z)
  • SMF endpoint: http://10.100.200.6:8000

Control comparison on the same SMF instance:

  • GET /nsmf-oam/v1/ (no token) -> 401 Unauthorized
  • DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1 (no token) -> 500 Internal Server Error (panic)

The sibling nsmf-oam returning 401 proves OAuth middleware IS wired in for other SMF route groups; the UPI group specifically is mounted without it.

Vulnerable handler logic (paths in free5gc/smf):

// NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:94..99
if upNode.Type == smf_context.UPNODE_UPF {
    go s.Processor().ReleaseAllResourcesOfUPF(upNode.UPF)
}
upi.UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef)
upNode.UPF.CancelAssociation()   // <-- panics for AN-typed nodes; nil UPF

The Type == UPNODE_UPF guard only protects the asynchronous ReleaseAllResourcesOfUPF call. After that, UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) runs unconditionally (so the topology mutation lands first), and then upNode.UPF.CancelAssociation() is called unconditionally on a *UPF that is nil for AN nodes by construction.

Code evidence:

  • UPI group mounted WITHOUT auth middleware:
  • NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:76
  • NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:78
  • Protected control comparison (other SMF groups DO use auth):
  • NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:99
  • NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:105
  • Delete handler (panic site):
  • NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:94
  • NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:99
  • AN nodes are constructed without a UPF object (root cause of the nil deref):
  • NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:95
  • NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:97

PoC

Reproduced end-to-end against the running SMF at http://10.100.200.6:8000.

  1. Control: protected sibling OAM route returns 401:
curl -i http://10.100.200.6:8000/nsmf-oam/v1/
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
  1. Trigger: unauthenticated DELETE on the default AN node gNB1:
curl -i -X DELETE http://10.100.200.6:8000/upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
  1. SMF container logs (docker logs --tail 120 smf) show topology mutation landing BEFORE the panic, and the panic stack pointing at api_upi.go:99:
[INFO][SMF][Init] UPNode [gNB1] found. Deleting it.
[INFO][SMF][Init] Delete UPLink [UPF] <=> [gNB1].
[ERRO][SMF][GIN] panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
github.com/free5gc/smf/internal/sbi.(*Server).DeleteUpNodeLink
    /go/src/free5gc/NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:99 +0x298
[INFO][SMF][GIN] | 500 | DELETE | /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1

The lab state was manually restored after validation by re-creating the AN entry; that POST is restoration-only and is NOT a mitigation.

Impact

Three compounding defects on the same SMF SBI surface:

  1. Missing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on the UPI route group, so the trigger is reachable to any off-path network attacker who can reach SMF on the SBI -- no token, no session, no UE state needed. The same-instance nsmf-oam returning 401 proves the middleware is wired in elsewhere and only missing on UPI.
  2. NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) in DeleteUpNodeLink: the Type == UPNODE_UPF guard only covers the async release call, then upNode.UPF.CancelAssociation() runs unconditionally on AN-typed nodes that have a nil UPF field by construction.
  3. Order of operations (CWE-755 / CWE-754): UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) mutates the in-memory user-plane topology BEFORE the dereference panics, so the topology change lands even though the request returns 500. This makes the bug state-mutating, not just a plain panic.

Any party that can reach SMF on the SBI can:

  • Delete arbitrary named entries (e.g. gNB1) from SMF's in-memory user-plane topology anonymously via a single DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{ref} request, denying SMF's ability to consider that AN/UPF in subsequent UPF selection / PFCP path establishment for legitimate UE sessions.
  • Trigger a panic on the SMF goroutine for the deleted-AN case, even though Gin recovers the goroutine, leaving the topology in the mutated state above.
  • Repeat the trigger by name against any AN entry, sustaining the topology denial without ever authenticating.

This is a strict superset of the impact in free5gc/free5gc#887 for this specific code path: same auth bypass, plus a concrete request-triggerable nil deref, plus state mutation that survives the panic.

Affected: free5gc v4.2.1.

Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/905 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/smf/pull/199

Credited to LinZiyuu.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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