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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-44335: PraisonAI has an SSRF bypass

highCVSS 4.0 7.7 · 3.1 9.8GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g

Summary The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. Details The current PraisonAI project uses validateurl to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.

Published May 6, 2026 · Updated May 12, 2026

Affected packages

praisonaiagents

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
<= 1.6.31
Fixed in
1.6.32
Check
pip show praisonaiagents

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.

Details

The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.

However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using _validate_url for URL validation, and then using _get_session().get to send the request.

In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.

The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:

  • urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public)
  • requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to 127.0.0.1 (internal)

Below is a test code I wrote following the code.

import sys
from pathlib import Path
from pprint import pprint

sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(r"D:/BaiduNetdiskDownload/PraisonAI-main/PraisonAI-main/src/praisonai-agents")))

from praisonaiagents.tools import spider_tools

# url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"
url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666"

result = spider_tools.scrape_page(url)

if isinstance(result, dict) and "error" in result:
    print("scrape failed:", result["error"])
else:
    pprint(result)

When an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666/, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it.

However, when an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1, the detection logic resolves the host to 1.1.1.1, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to http://127.0.0.1:6666, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack.

PoC

http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1

Impact

SSRF

Credited to Fushuling, RacerZ-fighting.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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