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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-44513: Diffusers has a `trust_remote_code` bypass via `custom_pipeline` and local custom components

highCVSS 3.1 8.8GHSA-98h9-4798-4q5v

Impact A trustremotecode bypass in DiffusionPipeline.frompretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trustremotecode=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trustremotecode gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that…

Published May 7, 2026 · Updated Jun 5, 2026

Affected packages

diffusers

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 0.38.0
Fixed in
0.38.0
Check
pip show diffusers

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Impact

A trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check:

  1. Cross-repo `custom_pipeline`. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained('repoA', custom_pipeline='attacker/repoB', trust_remote_code=False) — the gate evaluated against repoA's file list rather than repoB's, so repoB's pipeline.py was loaded and executed.
  2. Local snapshot + Hub `custom_pipeline`. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained('/local/snapshot', custom_pipeline='attacker/repoB', trust_remote_code=False) — the local-path branch never invoked download(), so the gate was never reached and remote code from repoB executed.
  3. Local snapshot with custom components. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained('/local/snapshot', trust_remote_code=False) where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. unet/my_unet_model.py) referenced from model_index.json — same root cause; the local path skipped download() and custom component code executed.

Silent remote code execution on the victim's machine. Anyone calling DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained with custom pipelines is impacted.

Patches

Yes. Fixed in diffusers 0.38.0 via PR #13448. All users on versions < 0.38.0 should upgrade:

pip install --upgrade "diffusers>=0.38.0"

The fix moves the trust_remote_code gate out of DiffusionPipeline.download() and into get_cached_module_file in src/diffusers/utils/dynamic_modules_utils.py, which is the actual chokepoint for every dynamic module load (local, Hub, or community mirror). All three variants now raise ValueError instead of executing untrusted code.

Workarounds

If upgrading immediately is not possible:

  • Only call from_pretrained with pretrained_model_name_or_path, custom_pipeline, and local snapshot directories from fully trusted sources that have been audited.
  • Do not pass custom_pipeline= pointing at a Hub repository different from the primary pretrained_model_name_or_path before reading its pipeline.py.
  • Before calling from_pretrained on a local snapshot, inspect the snapshot for unexpected *.py files, especially under component subdirectories (unet/, scheduler/, etc.) and at the snapshot root.

These are mitigations, not fixes — the only complete remediation is upgrading to 0.38.0.

Resources

  • Fix: https://github.com/huggingface/diffusers/pull/13448
  • Original issue: https://github.com/huggingface/diffusers/issues/13446
  • Release notes: https://github.com/huggingface/diffusers/releases/tag/v0.38.0
  • CWE-94: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html

Credited to hlky, Vancir.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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