CVE-2026-44520: docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler
Impact The URLInputHandler class in doclinggraph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation.
Published May 7, 2026 · Updated May 14, 2026
Affected packages
docling-graph
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 1.5.0
- Fixed in
- 1.5.1
- Check
pip show docling-graph
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.
An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:
- Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g.
169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials - Internal services on loopback (
127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x,172.16.x,192.168.x)
This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.
Patches
The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.
Users should upgrade immediately:
pip install --upgrade docling-graphThe fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to `URLInputHandler` come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.
Resources
Credited to ayoub-ibm, dolfim-ibm.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
