CVE-2026-44572: Next.js's Middleware / Proxy redirects can be cache-poisoned
Impact Next.js uses the x-nextjs-data request header for internal data requests. On affected versions, an external client could send this header on a normal request to a path handled by middleware that returns a redirect. When that happened, the middleware/proxy could treat the request as a data request and replace the standard Location redirect header with the internal x-nextjs-redirect header.
Published May 11, 2026 · Updated May 14, 2026
Affected packages
next
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 12.2.0, < 15.5.16
- Fixed in
- 15.5.16
- Check
npm ls next
next
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 16.0.0, < 16.2.5
- Fixed in
- 16.2.5
- Check
npm ls next
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
Next.js uses the x-nextjs-data request header for internal data requests. On affected versions, an external client could send this header on a normal request to a path handled by middleware that returns a redirect.
When that happened, the middleware/proxy could treat the request as a data request and replace the standard Location redirect header with the internal x-nextjs-redirect header. Browsers do not follow x-nextjs-redirect, so the response became an unusable redirect for normal clients.
If the application was deployed behind a CDN or reverse proxy that caches 3xx responses without varying on this header, a single attacker request could poison the cached redirect response for the affected path. Subsequent visitors could then receive a cached redirect response without a Location header, causing a denial of service for that redirect path until the cache entry expired or was purged.
Affected scenarios
This affects applications that:
- use middleware or proxy redirects
- are deployed behind a caching CDN or reverse proxy
- allow 3xx responses on those paths to be cached without differentiating internal data requests from normal requests
Fix
The fix stops trusting x-nextjs-data by itself for middleware redirect handling. A request is now treated as an internal data request only when it is validated as such by internal routing state, preserving legitimate data-request redirect behavior while preventing external header injection from changing normal redirect responses.
Workarounds
Before upgrading, users can reduce risk by:
- configuring the CDN or reverse proxy to vary its cache key on
x-nextjs-datafor affected responses
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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