CVE-2026-44741: Pimcore Admin Classic Bundle Vulnerable to SQL Injection in Translation Grid Date Filter via Unsanitized Property Parameter
GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-369 Summary SQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter — the user-supplied property field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a UNIXTIMESTAMP(DATE(FROMUNIXTIME(...))) SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation.
Published May 27, 2026 · Updated Jul 10, 2026
Affected packages
pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- >= 2.0.0-RC1, <= 2.3.5
- Fixed in
- 2.3.6
- Check
composer show pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 1.7.18
- Fixed in
- 1.7.18
- Check
composer show pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-369
Summary
SQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter — the user-supplied property field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...))) SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation.
Severity
CVSS 3.1: 8.8 (High) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Component
- Package:
pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle - File:
src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php - Lines: 565 (input), 569 (inadequate sanitization), 593 (injection point)
- Endpoint:
POST /admin/translation/translations
Description
The translation grid endpoint processes JSON filter parameters. When a filter has type: "date", the property field is extracted and used to construct a SQL expression:
$fieldname = $filter[$propertyField]; // Line 565 — user input
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname); // Line 569 — trivially bypassable
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname; // Line 577
$fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))"; // Line 593 — injectionThe str_replace('--', '') sanitization is trivially bypassable (use /**/ comments or ----). In non-language mode, $fieldname is concatenated directly into the SQL condition without quoting or parameterization.
Impact
Authenticated user with translations view permission can extract arbitrary database data via UNION-based or error-based SQL injection. Combined with GM-249 (unsafe unserialize), this enables an SQLi → deserialization → RCE chain.
Proof of Concept
POST /admin/translation/translations
filter=[{"property":"1))) UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ((1","type":"date","operator":"eq","value":"2026-01-01"}]Suggested Fix
Validate $fieldname against an allowlist of valid column names before SQL interpolation:
$allowedDateColumns = ['creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
if (!in_array($fieldname, $allowedDateColumns, true)) {
continue;
}References
- CWE-89: SQL Injection
- Related: CVE-2026-27461 (RLIKE injection in Dependency/Dao.php — different code path)
---
Suggested Fix
In TranslationController.php: (1) Add allowlist check for non-language fieldnames before processing. (2) Replace raw string interpolation UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname}))) with $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname) to prevent SQL injection in date filter expressions.
--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
|| $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
continue;
}
+ // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+ $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+ if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (!$languageMode) {
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
}
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
} elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
$operator = '=';
- $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+ // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+ $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
}
---
Proposed Fix
--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
|| $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
continue;
}
+ // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+ $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+ if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (!$languageMode) {
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
}
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
} elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
$operator = '=';
- $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+ // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+ $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
}Happy to submit this as a PR against a private fork if that is the preferred workflow.
Credited to tikket1, kingjia90.
References
- https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92
- https://github.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/pull/1111
- https://github.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/commit/80e57a23d9e19574eddfe9b08e8f26785b2b0d90
- https://github.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/releases/tag/v2.3.6
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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