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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-45045: GoFiber Vulnerable to X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.3GHSA-gcfq-8gqf-4876

Summary The BalancerForward proxy helper in GoFiber uses Header.Add() instead of Header.Set() when injecting the X-Real-IP header. This appends the real client IP as a second header value rather than replacing any attacker-supplied value. Upstream servers that read the first X-Real-IP header (nginx, Express, most HTTP servers) use the attacker's spoofed IP for logging, rate limiting, and access control.

Published Jul 2, 2026 · Updated Aug 4, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 3.2.0
Fixed in
3.3.0
Check
go list -m github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3

github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 2.52.13
Fixed in
2.52.14
Check
go list -m github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The BalancerForward proxy helper in GoFiber uses Header.Add() instead of Header.Set() when injecting the X-Real-IP header. This appends the real client IP as a second header value rather than replacing any attacker-supplied value. Upstream servers that read the first X-Real-IP header (nginx, Express, most HTTP servers) use the attacker's spoofed IP for logging, rate limiting, and access control.

Vulnerable Code

File: middleware/proxy/proxy.go, lines 270-285

func BalancerForward(servers []string, clients ...*fasthttp.Client) fiber.Handler {
    r := &roundrobin{
        current: 0,
        pool:    servers,
    }
    return func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
        server := r.get()
        if !strings.HasPrefix(server, "http") {
            server = "http://" + server
        }
        c.Request().Header.Add("X-Real-IP", c.IP())   // line 282: Add, not Set
        return Do(c, server+c.OriginalURL(), clients...)
    }
}

Data Flow

  1. Attacker sends request with X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1 (spoofed internal IP)
  2. BalancerForward handler executes at line 282
  3. c.Request().Header.Add("X-Real-IP", c.IP()) APPENDS the real IP as a second header
  4. Upstream server receives: X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1 AND X-Real-IP: <real-attacker-ip>
  5. Most HTTP servers (nginx, Node.js, Apache) read the FIRST value
  6. Upstream uses 10.0.0.1 for all IP-dependent logic

Impact

  • Rate limit bypass: IP-based rate limiting at the upstream uses the spoofed IP, allowing unlimited requests
  • IP ACL bypass: Internal IP allowlists (e.g., admin panels restricted to 10.0.0.0/8) can be bypassed
  • Audit log poisoning: Security logs record the spoofed IP, making incident investigation unreliable
  • Geolocation bypass: IP-based geofencing or region restrictions are circumvented

Fix

Replace Header.Add() with Header.Set() at line 282:

c.Request().Header.Set("X-Real-IP", c.IP())

Header.Set() replaces any existing header value, ensuring only the real client IP is forwarded.

Credited to TristanInSec, ReneWerner87, gaby, 0x01code.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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