CVE-2026-45363: ruby-jwt: Empty-key HMAC bypass; cross-language sibling of CVE-2026-44351
JWT.decode(token, '', true, algorithm: 'HS256') accepts an attacker-forged token. OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', '', payload) returns a valid digest under an empty key, and no raise InvalidKeyError if key.empty? precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm. The same path is reached when a keyfinder block or keyfinder: argument returns "", nil, or an array containing nil for an unknown key.
Published May 18, 2026 · Updated Jun 2, 2026
Affected packages
jwt
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0, < 3.2.0
- Fixed in
- 3.2.0
- Check
bundle info jwt
jwt
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 2.10.3
- Fixed in
- 2.10.3
- Check
bundle info jwt
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
JWT.decode(token, '', true, algorithm: 'HS256') accepts an attacker-forged token. OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', '', payload) returns a valid digest under an empty key, and no raise InvalidKeyError if key.empty? precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm.
JWT.decode(token, "", true, algorithm: 'HS256')
-> JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: "", ...)
-> OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', "", signing_input) == signatureThe same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns "", nil, or an array containing nil for an unknown key. JWT::Decode#find_key only rejects literal nil and empty arrays, and JWT::JWA::Hmac silently coerces nil to "" (signing_key ||= '') before signing.
JWT.decode(token, nil, true, algorithms: ['HS256']) { |_h| "" }
-> find_key returns "" # "" && !Array("").empty? == true
-> JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: "", ...)
-> verifiesCommon application patterns that produce the unsafe value: redis.get("kid:#{kid}").to_s, ORM string columns with default: '', ENV['SECRET'] || '', Hash.new('') lookups, [primary, fallback] where fallback may be nil. Applications passing a non-empty static key:, or whose keyfinder returns nil / raises on miss, are not affected.
The existing enforce_hmac_key_length option would block this but defaults to false. On OpenSSL ≥ 3.5 the empty-key HMAC.digest call no longer raises, so the OpenSSL-3.0 rescue in JWA::Hmac#sign does not fire.
Affects HS256/HS384/HS512 via both JWT.decode (positional key and block keyfinder) and JWT::EncodedToken#verify_signature!(key_finder:)
Credited to SnailSploit, perryn, evansalter, canderson-activatecare.
References
- https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-c32j-vqhx-rx3x
- https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/commit/db560b769a07bd9724e77ff505011ac01872106f
- https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/releases/tag/v3.2.0
- https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/issues/724
- https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/releases/tag/v2.10.3
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/jwt/CVE-2026-45363.yml
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45363
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c32j-vqhx-rx3x
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
