CVE-2026-45718: Budibase: Row Action Trigger Bypasses View Row Filter Security Boundary Allowing Action on Out-of-Scope Rows
Summary The row action trigger endpoint (POST /api/tables/:sourceId/actions/:actionId/trigger) fails to validate that the user-supplied rowId is within the scope of the view's row filters. A user with access to a filtered view can trigger row actions on any row in the underlying table, including rows explicitly excluded by the view's security filters.
Published May 18, 2026 · Updated Jun 8, 2026
Affected packages
budibase
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 3.38.1
- Fixed in
- 3.38.1
- Check
npm ls budibase
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The row action trigger endpoint (POST /api/tables/:sourceId/actions/:actionId/trigger) fails to validate that the user-supplied rowId is within the scope of the view's row filters. A user with access to a filtered view can trigger row actions on any row in the underlying table, including rows explicitly excluded by the view's security filters.
Details
View filters in Budibase are treated as a security boundary. The search path (packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rows/search.ts:93-94) explicitly enforces view query filters with the comment: *"that could let users find rows they should not be allowed to access."*
However, the row action trigger path bypasses this enforcement entirely:
- Route (
packages/server/src/api/routes/rowAction.ts:55-59): Accepts asourceIdthat can be a viewId.
- Middleware (
packages/server/src/middleware/triggerRowActionAuthorised.ts:24-55): Correctly validates that the user has READ permission on the view and that the row action is enabled for that view. However, at line 55 it setsctx.params.tableId = tableIdwheretableIdis the underlying table extracted from the viewId — the viewId is discarded.
// triggerRowActionAuthorised.ts:24-26
const tableId = isTableIdOrExternalTableId(sourceId)
? sourceId
: getTableIdFromViewId(sourceId) // extracts underlying table
// Line 55: viewId context is lost
ctx.params.tableId = tableId- Controller (
packages/server/src/api/controllers/rowAction/run.ts:11): Reads onlytableIdfrom params — the view context is gone.
const { tableId, actionId } = ctx.params
const { rowId } = ctx.request.body
await sdk.rowActions.run(tableId, actionId, rowId, ctx.user)- SDK (
packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rowActions/crud.ts:254): Fetches the row usingsdk.rows.find(tableId, rowId)— directly from the table with no view filter enforcement.
const row = await sdk.rows.find(tableId, rowId) // No view filter checkThe sdk.rows.find function (packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rows/internal.ts:67-88) fetches the row by ID directly from the database, only validating that row.tableId === tableId. It never checks whether the row matches the view's query filters.
PoC
# Prerequisites:
# 1. Create a table with a "status" column containing rows: "active" and "archived"
# 2. Create a view filtering to status="active", assign it to BASIC role
# 3. Enable a row action for that view
# 4. Note the rowId of an "archived" row (not visible through the view)
# As a BASIC-role user with access only to the filtered view:
# Trigger the row action on a row OUTSIDE the view's filter scope
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:10000/api/tables/<viewId>/actions/<actionId>/trigger' \
-H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<basic_user_jwt>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"rowId": "<archived_row_id>"}'
# Expected: 403 or 404 (row not in view scope)
# Actual: 200 {"message": "Row action triggered."}
# The automation executes with the full archived row data,
# despite view filters excluding it from the user's access.Impact
A user with BASIC role access to a filtered view can execute row actions (automations) on any row in the underlying table, including rows hidden by the view's security filters. The impact depends on what the triggered automation does:
- Information disclosure: The automation receives the full row data as input, which may contain fields/values the user should not see.
- Unauthorized data modification: If the automation modifies rows, the attacker can cause changes to rows outside their authorized scope.
- Unauthorized actions: If the automation sends notifications, calls webhooks, or performs other side effects, the attacker can trigger these for out-of-scope rows.
This breaks the security model established by view filters, which are explicitly documented as preventing users from accessing rows they should not see.
Recommended Fix
The middleware should pass the viewId to the controller, and the SDK run function should validate the row against the view's filters before executing the automation.
In packages/server/src/middleware/triggerRowActionAuthorised.ts, preserve the sourceId:
// Line 55: preserve the original sourceId for downstream filter validation
ctx.params.tableId = tableId
ctx.params.sourceId = viewId || tableId // ADD THISIn packages/server/src/api/controllers/rowAction/run.ts, pass the sourceId:
export async function run(
ctx: Ctx<RowActionTriggerRequest, RowActionTriggerResponse>
) {
const { tableId, actionId, sourceId } = ctx.params
const { rowId } = ctx.request.body
await sdk.rowActions.run(tableId, actionId, rowId, ctx.user, sourceId)
ctx.body = { message: "Row action triggered." }
}In packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rowActions/crud.ts, validate the row against view filters:
export async function run(
tableId: any,
rowActionId: any,
rowId: string,
user: User,
sourceId?: string
) {
const table = await sdk.tables.getTable(tableId)
if (!table) {
throw new HTTPError("Table not found", 404)
}
// If triggered from a view, validate the row is within the view's scope
if (sourceId && isViewId(sourceId)) {
const result = await sdk.rows.search({
viewId: sourceId,
query: { equal: { _id: rowId } },
limit: 1,
})
if (!result.rows.length) {
throw new HTTPError("Row not found in view scope", 403)
}
}
const { automationId } = await get(tableId, rowActionId)
const automation = await sdk.automations.get(automationId)
const row = await sdk.rows.find(tableId, rowId)
// ... rest unchanged
}Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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