CVE-2026-46360: phpMyFAQ has a SVG Sanitizer Entity Decoding Depth Limit Bypass Leading to Stored XSS
Summary The SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities() method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of javascript in an href attribute value with 5 levels of & encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., j for j), an attacker can bypass both isSafe() detection and sanitize() removal.
Published May 6, 2026 · Updated Jun 9, 2026
Affected packages
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.1.1
- Fixed in
- 4.1.2
- Check
composer show phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
thorsten/phpmyfaq
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 4.1.1
- Fixed in
- 4.1.2
- Check
composer show thorsten/phpmyfaq
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities() method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of javascript in an href attribute value with 5 levels of & encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., &amp;amp;amp;amp;#106; for j), an attacker can bypass both isSafe() detection and sanitize() removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with image/svg+xml content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining &#NNN; entities, resulting in a clickable javascript: link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.
Details
Root cause: decodeAllEntities() at phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249 limits entity decoding to maxIterations=5. Each iteration: (1) decodes &#NNN; numeric entities, (2) decodes &#xHH; hex entities, (3) calls html_entity_decode() which resolves one level of & → &. With 5 levels of & wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the & nesting, leaving the final &#NNN; numeric entities unresolved.
Code path:
- Authenticated user with
FAQ_EDITpermission uploads SVG viaPOST /admin/api/content/images(ImageController::upload()at line 39) - File extension is
svg→SvgSanitizer::isSafe()called (line 114) isSafe()callsdecodeAllEntities()— 5 iterations resolve&nesting but leaveja...(numeric entities forjavascript)- Pattern matching at line 47 (
/href\s*=\s*["\'][\s]*javascript\s*:/i) does not matchja... isSafe()returns true — file saved without any sanitization- SVG served directly by web server from
content/user/images/withimage/svg+xmlMIME type - Browser's XML parser decodes
j→j,a→a, etc., reconstructingjavascript:alert(document.domain) - User clicks the SVG link → JavaScript executes in the phpMyFAQ origin
The bypass is even simpler than initially described — no <script> decoy tag is needed. Since isSafe() itself is bypassed, the file is stored without sanitization and the sanitize() code path is never reached.
Relevant code in `decodeAllEntities()`:
// phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249
private function decodeAllEntities(string $content): string
{
$previous = '';
$decoded = $content;
$maxIterations = 5; // <-- insufficient for 5 levels of & + numeric entity
while ($decoded !== $previous && $maxIterations-- > 0) {
$previous = $decoded;
// Step 1: Decode decimal entities (j → j)
$decoded = preg_replace_callback('/&#(\d+);/', ...);
// Step 2: Decode hex entities (j → j)
$decoded = preg_replace_callback('/&#x([0-9a-fA-F]+);/', ...);
// Step 3: Decode named HTML entities (& → &)
$decoded = html_entity_decode($decoded, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8');
}
// After 5 iterations with 5 & levels: j remains undecoded
return preg_replace('/[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]/', '', $decoded);
}PoC
Upload an SVG file containing a javascript: href where each character of javascript is entity-encoded with 5 levels of & nesting around numeric entities. No <script> decoy is required — isSafe() itself is bypassed.
Step 1: Create malicious SVG file (`xss.svg`):
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 200 200">
<circle cx="100" cy="100" r="80" fill="red"/>
<text x="100" y="110" text-anchor="middle" fill="white" font-size="20">Click me</text>
</svg>Step 2: Upload via admin image upload endpoint:
curl -b 'session_cookie' \
-F "files[][email protected]" \
"https://TARGET/admin/api/content/images?csrf=VALID_TOKEN"Expected response: {"success": true, ...} with the uploaded file URL.
Step 3: Access the uploaded SVG directly:
https://TARGET/content/user/images/1712345678_xss.svgThe browser renders the SVG as image/svg+xml. The XML parser decodes j → j, a → a, etc., producing href="javascript:alert(document.domain)". Clicking the red circle executes JavaScript in the phpMyFAQ origin.
Impact
- Stored XSS: Any user (including other administrators) who views and clicks the malicious SVG link has JavaScript executed in their browser within the phpMyFAQ origin.
- Session hijacking: Attacker can steal session cookies and CSRF tokens of other admins.
- Privilege escalation: An editor-level user can execute JavaScript as a super-admin who views the image, potentially gaining full administrative control.
- Data exfiltration: Access to all FAQ content, user data, and configuration accessible through the admin interface.
The blast radius is limited by the requirement that a victim must click the link within the SVG. However, the SVG can be crafted to make the clickable area cover the entire visible image (as shown in the PoC), and the attacker controls the visual appearance.
Recommended Fix
The root cause is that decodeAllEntities() can be exhausted by deeply nested & encoding. The fix should ensure that after the decoding loop exits, a final pass of numeric/hex entity decoding is performed:
// phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php - decodeAllEntities()
private function decodeAllEntities(string $content): string
{
$previous = '';
$decoded = $content;
$maxIterations = 10; // Increase from 5 to handle deeper nesting
while ($decoded !== $previous && $maxIterations-- > 0) {
$previous = $decoded;
$decoded = preg_replace_callback(
'/&#(\d+);/',
static fn(array $matches): string => mb_chr((int) $matches[1], encoding: 'UTF-8'),
$decoded,
);
$decoded = preg_replace_callback(
'/&#x([0-9a-fA-F]+);/',
static fn(array $matches): string => mb_chr(hexdec($matches[1]), encoding: 'UTF-8'),
$decoded,
);
$decoded = html_entity_decode($decoded, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5, encoding: 'UTF-8');
}
// Safety net: if the loop exited due to iteration limit, do a final
// numeric/hex entity decode pass to catch any remaining &#NNN; entities
$decoded = preg_replace_callback(
'/&#(\d+);/',
static fn(array $matches): string => mb_chr((int) $matches[1], encoding: 'UTF-8'),
$decoded,
);
$decoded = preg_replace_callback(
'/&#x([0-9a-fA-F]+);/',
static fn(array $matches): string => mb_chr(hexdec($matches[1]), encoding: 'UTF-8'),
$decoded,
);
return preg_replace('/[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]/', replacement: '', subject: $decoded);
}Additionally, consider serving uploaded SVG files with Content-Disposition: attachment or Content-Type: application/octet-stream to prevent browser rendering, as a defense-in-depth measure.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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