CVE-2026-47183: zeroconf: Unbounded exception-dedup state retains packet buffers via traceback frame locals, enabling LAN-local memory exhaustion
Impact DNSIncoming.logexceptiondebug and the four QuietLogger exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded seenlogs dict keyed by str(sys.excinfo()[1]). The seven IncomingDecodeError messages raised from readname / decodelabelsatoffset (RFC 6762 §18 name-decoding error paths) all embed self.source — the peer's ephemeral source port, varying per packet — plus byte offset and pointer link, so every attacker-influenced…
Published May 29, 2026
Affected packages
zeroconf
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.149.6
- Fixed in
- 0.149.6
- Check
pip show zeroconf
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
DNSIncoming._log_exception_debug and the four QuietLogger exception-dedup methods stored an unbounded _seen_logs dict keyed by str(sys.exc_info()[1]). The seven IncomingDecodeError messages raised from _read_name / _decode_labels_at_offset (RFC 6762 §18 name-decoding error paths) all embed self.source — the peer's ephemeral source port, varying per packet — plus byte offset and pointer link, so every attacker-influenced combination produced a fresh dedup key. The stored value was the full sys.exc_info() triple, whose traceback's frame locals retained self.data (the raw inbound packet, up to 8966 bytes per RFC 6762 §17). Each unique malformed packet therefore pinned ~9 KB until process exit.
Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, 224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) can drive memory growth at line rate; that includes a guest on the same Wi-Fi, a compromised IoT device, or a container on a shared bridge. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic trivially OOM-kills the process, and mDNS-dependent features (HomeKit, Chromecast/Matter, AirPlay, printers) degrade or fail.
Patches
Fixed in zeroconf 0.149.6 (PR #1717). Upgrade to >= 0.149.6.
Workarounds
There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.
Resources
- PR #1717, fix
- Issue #1714, public tracking issue
- RFC 6762 §17, RFC 6762 §18, CWE-400
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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