CVE-2026-47242: Net::IMAP: Command Injection via ID command argument
Summary Two Net::IMAP commands, #id and #enable, do not validate their arguments. Arguments to either command could be used by an attacker to inject arbitrary IMAP commands. Please note that passing untrusted inputs to these commands is usually inappropriate and expected to be uncommon.
Published Jun 9, 2026 · Updated Jul 6, 2026
Affected packages
net-imap
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 0.6.0, <= 0.6.4
- Fixed in
- 0.6.4.1
- Check
bundle info net-imap
net-imap
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- <= 0.5.14
- Fixed in
- 0.5.15
- Check
bundle info net-imap
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Two Net::IMAP commands, #id and #enable, do not validate their arguments. Arguments to either command could be used by an attacker to inject arbitrary IMAP commands.
Please note that passing untrusted inputs to these commands is usually inappropriate and expected to be uncommon.
Details
When Net::IMAP#id is called with a hash argument, although the ID field value strings are correctly quoted (escaping quoted specials), they were not validated to prohibit CRLF sequences.
While Net::IMAP#enable does process its arguments for aliases, it does not validate them as valid atoms (or as a list of valid atoms). The #to_s value is sent verbatim.
Impact
This is expected to impact very few users: use of untrusted user input for either command is expected to be very uncommon.
The documentation for #enable explicitly warns that using any arguments that are not in the explicitly supported list may result in undocumented behavior. Using arbitrary untrusted user input for #enable will always be inappropriate.
Although client ID field values will most commonly be static and hardcoded, dynamic input sources may be used. For example, client ID fields may be set by configuration or version numbers. Using untrusted user inputs for client ID fields is expected to be uncommon. But any untrusted inputs to client ID can trivially exploit this vulnerability.
Untrusted inputs to either command may include a CRLF sequence followed by a new IMAP command (like DELETE mailbox). Although this does not directly enable data exfiltration, it could be combined with other attack vectors or knowledge of the target system's attributes, e.g.: shared mail folders or the application's installed response handlers.
Mitigation
Update to a version of net-imap which validates #id and #enable arguments.
Untrusted inputs should _never_ be used for #enable arguments.
If net-imap cannot be upgraded:
- do not use untrusted inputs for client ID field values
- or add validation that client ID field values must not contain any CR or LF bytes.
Credited to nevans.
References
- https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/security/advisories/GHSA-46q3-7gv7-qmgg
- https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.6.4.1
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47242
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/net-imap/CVE-2026-47242.yml
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-47242
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46q3-7gv7-qmgg
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More RubyGems vulnerabilities
All RubyGems entriesCVE-2026-47240
Net::IMAP: Command Injection via non-synchronizing literal in "raw" argument
medium5.8Jun 9, 2026CVE-2026-47241
Net::IMAP: Denial of Service via incomplete raw argument validation
low2.1Jun 9, 2026CVE-2026-42245
net-imap has quadratic complexity when reading response literals
low2.3May 4, 2026CVE-2026-42246
net-imap vulnerable to STARTTLS stripping via invalid response timing
high7.6May 4, 2026CVE-2026-42256
net-imap vulnerable to denial of service via high iteration count for `SCRAM-*` authentication
medium6.0May 4, 2026CVE-2026-42257
net-imap vulnerable to command Injection via "raw" arguments to multiple commands
medium5.8May 4, 2026
