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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-48702: Rekor has an OOM Condition due to Unbounded gzip Decompression in Alpine APK Parsing Logic

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-47q9-m4ww-924m

Description The Package.Unmarshal() function in pkg/types/alpine/apk.go decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing maxapkmetadatasize check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap…

Published Jun 25, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/sigstore/rekor

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 0.3.0, < 1.5.2
Fixed in
1.5.2
Check
go list -m github.com/sigstore/rekor

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Description

The Package.Unmarshal() function in pkg/types/alpine/apk.go decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing max_apk_metadata_size check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory.

An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine ProposedEntry, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware.

This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints:

  • POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)
  • POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)

Both invoke V001Entry.Canonicalize() → fetchExternalEntities() → apk.Unmarshal(packageData), which performs the unbounded decompression.

Workarounds

There is no effective workaround. Setting max_request_body_size reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting max_apk_metadata_size has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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