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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-49265: Oauthlib: Timing Attack Vulnerability in PKCE code_verifier Comparison (CWE-208)

mediumCVSS 3.1 6.8GHSA-xpv3-w29h-x7cv

Summary A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the PKCE (RFC 7636) implementation of the Authorization Code Grant flow. The codechallengemethodplain function uses Python's standard == operator for string comparison instead of a constant-time comparison function, potentially allowing timing-based attacks.

Published Sep 29, 2026 · Updated Oct 13, 2026

Affected packages

oauthlib

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 3.0.0, < 4.0.0
Fixed in
4.0.0
Check
pip show oauthlib

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

A timing side-channel vulnerability exists in the PKCE (RFC 7636) implementation of the Authorization Code Grant flow. The code_challenge_method_plain function uses Python's standard == operator for string comparison instead of a constant-time comparison function, potentially allowing timing-based attacks.

Affected Component

  • File: oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py
  • Functions: code_challenge_method_plain, code_challenge_method_s256
  • Vulnerability Type: CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)

Technical Details

Python's == operator uses short-circuit evaluation when comparing strings:

  1. Returns False immediately if lengths differ
  2. Compares characters left-to-right, stopping at first mismatch

This means comparison time varies linearly with the length of the common prefix between the attacker-supplied verifier and the stored challenge, creating a measurable timing oracle.

Proof of Concept

Tested locally against oauthlib source (network jitter eliminated to isolate pure Python execution time):

| Input | Result | Time (10M iterations) |
| Wrong first char (`B` + `A`*49) | Fast reject | 0.34106s |
| 49 chars correct (`A`*49 + `B`) | Deep compare | 0.37847s |
| **Difference** | | **0.03741s** |

The ~37ms delta over 10M iterations corresponds to nanosecond-level differences per call, which are statistically exploitable under controlled conditions.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker intercepts authorization_code via Custom URI Scheme Hijacking
  2. PKCE blocks token request — attacker lacks code_verifier
  3. Attacker sends repeated requests to /token endpoint measuring response times
  4. Using timing oracle, attacker recovers code_verifier character by character
  5. Attacker obtains Access Token → Account Takeover

Note: Practical exploitability is limited due to the single-use nature of > authorization codes and real-world network noise. However, the vulnerable > pattern should be corrected as a defense-in-depth measure.

Recommended Fix

Replace == with hmac.compare_digest() for constant-time comparison:

cr: Elvin Latifli

Credited to Rickidevs.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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