CVE-2026-50105: Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)
Summary Gitea's RSS/Atom feed handlers accept API-token Basic auth but perform no token-scope or public-only enforcement. A personal access token that is correctly blocked (HTTP 403) from a private repository on /raw, /media, /archive, and /releases/download/... — because it is marked public-only or lacks the repository scope category — still returns that repository's private content through the feed routes.
Published Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
code.gitea.io/gitea
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
- Check
go list -m code.gitea.io/gitea
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Gitea's RSS/Atom feed handlers accept API-token Basic auth but perform no token-scope or public-only enforcement. A personal access token that is correctly blocked (HTTP 403) from a private repository on /raw, /media, /archive, and /releases/download/... — because it is marked *public-only* or lacks the repository scope category — still returns that repository's private content through the feed routes. This is a token-confinement bypass and appears to be an incomplete fix of #37698, which added that scope enforcement to the download handlers but not to the sibling feed handlers.
This is not a cross-user access bug: the requesting account must still legitimately have repo read access (RepoAssignment + reqUnitCodeReader are enforced). What is bypassed is the guarantee that a *confined* token cannot reach private content — which is exactly the property #37698 was shipped to provide for downloads, and which matters when such a token is handed to a third-party service/CI, leaked, or used in a lower-trust integration.
Details
#37698 added context.CheckTokenScopes / CheckRepoScopedToken (services/context/permission.go) to the raw / media / archive / attachment download handlers, so a public-only or wrong-scope-category token cannot read private-repo content even when the owning user otherwise has access.
The feed handlers are registered with webAuth.AllowBasic (so they accept token Basic auth) but call no scope / public-only check. A grep for CheckTokenScopes / CheckRepoScopedToken / IsApiToken across routers/web/feed/ and the release feed handlers returns nothing.
Affected routes (all token-reachable via webAuth.AllowBasic, none call the scope check):
| Route | Handler | Private data exposed |
| `GET /{owner}/{repo}.rss` / `.atom` | `repo.Home` → `handleRepoHomeFeed` (`view_home.go`) | last-10 commits: SHA, full message, author name + email |
| `GET /{owner}/{repo}/rss/branch/*`, `/atom/branch/*` | `feed.RenderBranchFeed*` → `ShowBranchFeed` (`routers/web/feed/branch.go`) | same commit data, any branch |
| `GET /{owner}/{repo}/releases.rss` / `.atom` | `ReleasesFeedRSS/Atom` (`routers/web/repo/release.go`) → `ShowReleaseFeed` | private release names, notes, descriptions |
| `GET /{owner}/{repo}/tags.rss` / `.atom` | `TagsListFeedRSS/Atom` → `ShowReleaseFeed` | private tag names + messages |
| `GET /{user}.rss` / `.atom` | `showUserFeed` (`routers/web/feed/profile.go`), `includePrivate = self \|\| admin` | the token owner's private cross-repo activity stream |Inconsistency that pins this down: the branch-feed routes sit in the same route group as /raw, /media, /archive (all of which call checkDownloadTokenScope), and releases.rss sits next to /releases/attachments/{uuid} and /releases/download/... (both go through ServeAttachment → scope check). Only the feeds were missed. The API equivalents (ListReleases / ListTags) are scope-gated via tokenRequiresScopes.
Two distinct confinement bypasses:
- Public-only bypass. A token created with the *public-only* option is blocked (403) from a private repo on
/raw,/archive,/releases/download/..., but returns private commit / release data via.../releases.rss,.../rss/branch/*,/{owner}/{repo}.rss, and the owner's private activity via/{user}.rss. - Scope-category bypass. A token scoped to only e.g.
read:issue(noread:repository) is rejected by the download handlers but reads repository commit/release content via the feeds.
PoC
Verified live against the official gitea/gitea:1.26.2 Docker image (sqlite, feeds enabled).
Setup: non-admin user alice; private repo alice/secret with a commit "SECRET-COMMIT-MARKER ..." (file secret.txt) and a release "Private Release" / body "SECRET-RELEASE-MARKER ...". Two confined personal access tokens, both sent via HTTP Basic so the auth method is identical across download and feed — only the route differs:
- Token A: scopes
["public-only", "read:repository"] - Token B: scopes
["read:issue"]
# Token A — download is correctly blocked, feeds leak private content:
curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/raw/branch/main/secret.txt # => 403 (fix works)
curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/rss/branch/main # => 200, <title>SECRET-COMMIT-MARKER ...</title>
curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/releases.rss # => 200, SECRET-RELEASE-MARKER ...
curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A "https://<host>/alice.rss" # => 200, private activity
# Token B — wrong scope category, same split:
curl -u alice:$TOKEN_B https://<host>/alice/secret/raw/branch/main/secret.txt # => 403
curl -u alice:$TOKEN_B https://<host>/alice/secret/rss/branch/main # => 200, private commit leakedAnonymous baseline returns 404 on the repo feeds (data is genuinely private) and a marker-free 200 on /alice.rss (public activity only) — confirming the leak is gated only by the missing token check.
Impact
Information disclosure of private commit metadata (SHA, message, author name+email), release/tag notes, and the owner's private activity stream, to the holder of a confined token that was specifically configured *not* to reach private content. Not raw file blobs (feeds don't serve file contents). Requires a token belonging to an account that already has repo read access, so the realistic threat is a leaked / shared / lower-trust token rather than an anonymous attacker — which is precisely the threat model #37698 addressed for downloads.
Suggested remediation
Add a token-scope check at the top of each feed handler, mirroring checkDownloadTokenScope:
if context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository, auth_model.Read); ctx.Written() {
return
}for ShowBranchFeed, ShowRepoFeed, ShowFileFeed, ShowReleaseFeed (repo feeds). For the user feed, gate includePrivate behind a non-public-only token (or require the user / repository scope) so a confined token can't pull private activity.
Credited to CassianStarck.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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