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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-50568: Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape

lowCVSS 3.1 3.6GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4

SanitizeFilePath in pkg/utils/utils.go validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir). This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: /packages-extra/evil starts with /packages, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted.

Published Jul 28, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/fission/fission

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 1.24.0
Fixed in
1.25.0
Check
go list -m github.com/fission/fission

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

SanitizeFilePath in pkg/utils/utils.go validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir). This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: /packages-extra/evil starts with /packages, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted.

Callers included the builder's Clean handler (pkg/builder/builder.go:208) and the fetcher's Fetch / Upload handlers (pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher / builder's shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory.

Affected

  • Project: github.com/fission/fission
  • Versions: all versions through v1.24.0 with SanitizeFilePath in the tree
  • Audited commit: 647c141
  • Component: pkg/utils/utils.go:SanitizeFilePath
  • Callers: pkg/builder/builder.go:157,164,208, pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go:296,311,450,496,565,571
  • Configuration: default; requires a sibling directory to the safe dir to exist on the filesystem

Fix section (paste into the Fix / Patches field)

Fixed in v1.25.0 by:

  • PR #3445 (commit `8298e33e`) — migrate every SanitizeFilePath call site (fetcher: storePath /

tmpPath / secretDir / configDir / rename + writeSecretOrConfigMap; builder: srcPkg / deployPkg path validation and srcPkg stat) to new pkg/utils/root.go helpers (RootJoin, RootStat, RootWriteFile, RootMkdirAll, RootRename) that operate through os.Root. os.Root enforces directory confinement in the kernel and is recognized by CodeQL go/path-injection as a traversal barrier.

  • PR #3446 (commit `5aac6f0b`) — delete the deprecated SanitizeFilePath itself once no callers

remained. The vulnerable function no longer exists in the tree.

Credited to 0xshdax, sanketsudake.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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