CVE-2026-52799: Gogs Missing Authorization in Attachment Download
Summary In Gogs 0.14.1, GET /attachments/:uuid returns the raw attachment file without verifying whether the requester has view permission for the associated Issue/Comment/Release or the repository. In a test environment with REQUIRESIGNINVIEW = false, we confirmed that an unauthenticated user can download attachments belonging to a private repository.
Published Jun 22, 2026 · Updated Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
gogs.io/gogs
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 0.14.2
- Fixed in
- 0.14.3
- Check
go list -m gogs.io/gogs
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
In Gogs 0.14.1, GET /attachments/:uuid returns the raw attachment file without verifying whether the requester has view permission for the associated Issue/Comment/Release or the repository. In a test environment with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false, we confirmed that an unauthenticated user can download attachments belonging to a private repository.
Description
/attachments/:uuid retrieves an attachment record solely by the UUID provided in the URL and returns the corresponding local file without performing any authorization checks against the attachment’s parent object (Issue/Comment/Release) or the repository it belongs to. As a result, even attachments under private repositories can be downloaded by an unauthenticated user (or a user without proper permissions) as long as the UUID is known.
Relevant code (internal/cmd/web.go:306):
m.Get("/attachments/:uuid", func(c *context.Context) {
attach, err := database.GetAttachmentByUUID(c.Params(":uuid"))
if err != nil {
c.NotFoundOrError(err, "get attachment by UUID")
return
} else if !com.IsFile(attach.LocalPath()) {
c.NotFound()
return
}
fr, err := os.Open(attach.LocalPath())
if err != nil {
c.Error(err, "open attachment file")
return
}
defer fr.Close()
c.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox")
c.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public,max-age=86400")
c.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`inline; filename="%s"`, attach.Name))
if _, err = io.Copy(c.Resp, fr); err != nil {
c.Error(err, "copy from file to response")
return
}
})The UUID lookup itself also performs no validation tied to repository visibility or user permissions. Authorization is not enforced at this layer.
Relevant code (internal/database/attachment.go:124):
// GetAttachmentByUUID returns attachment by given UUID.
func GetAttachmentByUUID(uuid string) (*Attachment, error) {
return getAttachmentByUUID(x, uuid)
}Preconditions
- The attacker knows the target attachment’s UUID (i.e., the attachment URL).
- For unauthenticated exploitation:
[auth] REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false. - Even when
REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true, exploitation may still be possible because the handler does not check repository-level permissions; a user who can log in but lacks access to the target repository may still retrieve the attachment.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in as an administrator and create a private repository, e.g.
myadmin/idor-attach-1770724346-1a13bb. - Add an attachment to an Issue in that repository and note the attachment UUID (example UUID used during testing:
f06d90f8-5b62-4c10-ac8d-f11fdf870b57). - Log out and access the following as an unauthenticated user:
- The repository page → 404 Not Found
- The Issue page under that repository → 404 Not Found
GET /attachments/<uuid>→ the attachment file is successfully downloaded
Minimum Required Privileges
REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false: none (works without authentication).REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true: only the ability to log in (repository view permission is not required in practice).
Impact
- Confidential information attached to private repositories or restricted Issues/Releases may be disclosed.
- Examples include credentials, cryptographic keys, personal data, internal documents, or unpublished source code fragments.
- While the severity depends on the attachment contents, attachments frequently contain sensitive data, making the potential impact high.
Credited to odgrso.
References
- https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-p9f5-h3rx-j5qw
- https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8320
- https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/d3ca23f9f33d5710472a775d6dcd3a7bb128bb05
- https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52799
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p9f5-h3rx-j5qw
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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