CVE-2026-53540: python-multipart: Negative Content-Length in parse_form buffers the entire body in memory
Summary parseform() did not validate the Content-Length header before using it to bound its chunked read of the request body. A negative Content-Length turned the bounded read into a read-until-EOF, so the entire body was loaded into memory in a single read instead of in fixed-size chunks. Details parseform() reads the input stream in chunks, never reading more than the remaining Content-Length at a time.
Published Jun 15, 2026
Affected packages
python-multipart
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.0.31
- Fixed in
- 0.0.31
- Check
pip show python-multipart
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
parse_form() did not validate the Content-Length header before using it to bound its chunked read of the request body. A negative Content-Length turned the bounded read into a read-until-EOF, so the entire body was loaded into memory in a single read instead of in fixed-size chunks.
Details
parse_form() reads the input stream in chunks, never reading more than the remaining Content-Length at a time. The per-chunk size is computed as min(content_length - bytes_read, chunk_size). The header value was parsed to an integer without checking its sign, so a Content-Length of -1 made this expression negative, and input_stream.read(-1) reads until end of stream. The intended bounded, chunked read therefore collapsed into a single unbounded read of the whole stream. The amount read is still bounded by what the client actually sends.
Impact
This only affects code that calls parse_form() directly with a Content-Length header taken from attacker-controlled input and without normalizing a negative value first. No known package is affected:
- Starlette and FastAPI drive
MultipartParserdirectly from the ASGIreceive()stream and do not callparse_form(). - Known
parse_form()consumers either do not forwardContent-Lengthto it, recompute it from the already-read body, or run behind a layer (such as Werkzeug) that normalizes a negativeContent-Lengthto0.
The realistic exposure is limited to bespoke WSGI or http.server handlers that forward raw client headers into parse_form(). In that case a crafted request buffers the body in memory at once, degrading availability under concurrent requests rather than causing a complete denial of service.
Mitigation
Upgrade to version 0.0.31 or later, which rejects a negative Content-Length with a ValueError before reading the stream.
Credited to lullu57, seok-hee97.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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