CVE-2026-53604: nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths
Impact The web handler renderMobileBundle (internal/web/handlers.go:1325) passes the real pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build (internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54), resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path (success or any of the error paths at lines 56, 62, 68, 80, 86, 92, 98, 102, 109, 118, 150).
Published Jul 14, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 0.3.7
- Fixed in
- 0.3.8
- Check
go list -m github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
The web handler renderMobileBundle (internal/web/handlers.go:1325) passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build (internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54), resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path (success or any of the error paths at lines 56, 62, 68, 80, 86, 92, 98, 102, 109, 118, 150).
As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh.
The API handler (internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:74) already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected.
This is the same key-zeroization class previously addressed in GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v.
Patches
Add defer caMgr.Wipe() inside mobilebundle.Build immediately after the LoadByID call so every caller (web and API) is protected on all return paths. Ensure CAManager.Wipe() is idempotent, since the API handler also wipes the same manager.
Workarounds
None at the configuration level; requires a code fix.
Resources
internal/web/handlers.go:1325internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:74(correct reference implementation)- Prior related advisory: GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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