NewApp Monitoring is liveSign up free
AgentbeamBeta
Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-54097: File Browser: Cross-user unauthorized share-link deletion via unbounded prefix match in DeleteWithPathPrefix

highCVSS 4.0 7.2GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7

Summary A low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with create + delete permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's stored share.Link.Path.

Published Jun 12, 2026 · Updated Jul 21, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 1.11.0
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
go list -m github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser

github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 2.63.5
Fixed in
2.63.6
Check
go list -m github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

A low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with create + delete permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's stored share.Link.Path. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim's share links are irrevocably wiped.

Details

resourceDeleteHandler in http/resource.go cleans up any share records that reference a deleted file by calling:

// http/resource.go
err = d.store.Share.DeleteWithPathPrefix(file.Path)

file.Path here is the *logical* path from the URL of the deleting user's request (e.g. /a), not the absolute filesystem path. It is passed as-is to the bolt backend:

// storage/bolt/share.go
func (s shareBackend) DeleteWithPathPrefix(pathPrefix string) error {
    var links []share.Link
    if err := s.db.Prefix("Path", pathPrefix, &links); err != nil {
        return err
    }
    for _, link := range links {
        err = errors.Join(err, s.db.DeleteStruct(&share.Link{Hash: link.Hash}))
    }
    return err
}

Why the design contradicts this behavior. share.Link carries a UserID field and the application elsewhere treats shares as per-user owned resources. shareDeleteHandler explicitly enforces link.UserID != d.user.ID && !d.user.Perm.Admin → 403. The file-deletion side-effect path is the only location that bypasses this rule.

Impact

  • Integrity: unauthorized deletion of share-link metadata belonging to arbitrary users, including administrators.
  • Availability: effective denial-of-service of the share-link feature — a cooperating (or malicious) low-priv user can wipe the bulk of existing share links by iterating a short set of one- and two-character prefixes.

Credited to wooseokdotkim, hacdias.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

More Go vulnerabilities

All Go entries