CVE-2026-54766: Vikunja has a project duplication bypasses write-permission check on the target parent project
Summary The project-duplication endpoint fails to enforce write access to the target parent project. Any authenticated (non-link-share) user can duplicate a project they can read into any parent project on the instance, regardless of whether they have write access to that parent — injecting an attacker-owned project into another user's or team's project hierarchy.
Published Aug 28, 2026
Affected packages
code.vikunja.io/api
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 0.21.0, <= 2.3.0
- Fixed in
- 2.4.0
- Check
go list -m code.vikunja.io/api
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The project-duplication endpoint fails to enforce write access to the target parent project. Any authenticated (non-link-share) user can duplicate a project they can read into any parent project on the instance, regardless of whether they have write access to that parent — injecting an attacker-owned project into another user's or team's project hierarchy.
Details
ProjectDuplicate.CanCreate (pkg/models/project_duplicate.go) is meant to require write access to the parent the duplicate is placed under — its own comment says "Parent project exists + user has write access". The implementation does neither correctly:
func (pd *ProjectDuplicate) CanCreate(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth) (canCreate bool, err error) {
pd.Project = &Project{ID: pd.ProjectID}
canRead, _, err := pd.Project.CanRead(s, a)
if err != nil || !canRead {
return canRead, err
}
if pd.ParentProjectID == 0 {
return canRead, err
}
// Parent project exists + user has write access to is (-> can create new projects)
parent := &Project{ID: pd.ParentProjectID}
return parent.CanCreate(s, a) // <-- bug
}Two defects compound here:
- Wrong permission method. It calls
parent.CanCreate("may I create *this* project?") instead ofparent.CanWrite("may I create children *inside* this project?"). The latter is what the normal create path uses —POST /projectswith aparent_project_idenforcesparent.CanWriteviaProject.CanCreate(pkg/models/project_permissions.go:196-199).
- Unhydrated struct.
parentis constructed as&Project{ID: pd.ParentProjectID}and never loaded from the database, so its in-memoryParentProjectIDis always0. InsideProject.CanCreatethe only branch that performs any permission check isif p.ParentProjectID != 0 { return parent.CanWrite(...) }— which therefore never executes. Control falls through to the link-share check and thenreturn true, nil. The result istruefor any authenticated non-link-share user, for anyParentProjectID.
Nothing downstream re-checks: ProjectDuplicate.Create → CreateProject → checkProjectBeforeUpdateOrDelete (pkg/models/project.go:954) validates only that the parent exists, is not a pseudo-project, and introduces no cycle — no authorization.
Impact
An authenticated user can:
- Duplicate any project they can read (including their own) and attach the copy as a child of any parent project ID on the instance, with no write access to that parent.
- Inject an attacker-owned project into other users'/teams' project trees. The duplicate is owned by the attacker but appears inside the victim's hierarchy; members of the victim parent see it, and because Vikunja propagates parent access down the tree, they may inherit access to the injected project — enabling content injection / spam / phishing inside another tenant's workspace.
This is a bypass of the same parent-write guard that the ordinary create path enforces, so the duplicate route is an authorization hole for an operation that is otherwise correctly gated. The endpoint requires authentication; it does not expose or modify the victim's existing project data (the source is attacker-readable), so the impact is an integrity / access-control violation rather than confidentiality.
Proof of Concept
- As user A, create or have read access to any project
S(e.g. id 100). - Identify a parent project
P(e.g. id 5) owned by user B, to which A has no access. - Call
PUT /api/v1/projects/100/duplicatewith body{"parent_project_id": 5}. - The request succeeds (201). A new project owned by A is created as a child of B's project 5, despite A having no write access to it. The equivalent
POST /api/v1/projectswithparent_project_id: 5would be correctly rejected with 403.
Affected versions
Introduced with the namespace→project migration (commit fef253312, first released in v0.21.0) and present through the latest release (v2.3.0). The shared model also backs the new /api/v2 duplication route under review, so any v2 release would inherit the same flaw unless fixed in the model.
Recommended Fix
In ProjectDuplicate.CanCreate, check write access to the parent directly:
parent := &Project{ID: pd.ParentProjectID}
return parent.CanWrite(s, a)Project.CanWrite loads the project from the database and evaluates real permissions, fixing both the wrong-method and the unhydrated-struct defects at once and matching the documented contract. (It also rejects archived parents, which is desirable.)
References
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3239
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/d911caaa11c748c3abc6b98b3189afea2677bcb0
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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