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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-55430: Coder's subdomain workspace app routing trusts unauthenticated X-Forwarded-Host header, enabling cross-app data access

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.8GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w

Summary The workspace app proxy resolves the target app from httpapi.RequestHost() which prefers the X-Forwarded-Host header over the real Host header. No middleware strips X-Forwarded-Host before routing and the header is not browser-forbidden so client-side JavaScript can set it on fetch() calls.

Published Jul 6, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/coder/coder/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2
Fixed in
2.34.2
Check
go list -m github.com/coder/coder/v2

github.com/coder/coder/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8
Fixed in
2.33.8
Check
go list -m github.com/coder/coder/v2

github.com/coder/coder/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7
Fixed in
2.32.7
Check
go list -m github.com/coder/coder/v2

github.com/coder/coder/v2

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 2.29.17
Fixed in
2.29.17
Check
go list -m github.com/coder/coder/v2

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The workspace app proxy resolves the target app from httpapi.RequestHost() which prefers the X-Forwarded-Host header over the real Host header. No middleware strips X-Forwarded-Host before routing and the header is not browser-forbidden so client-side JavaScript can set it on fetch() calls.

Note: Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled, a victim who visits the attacker's shared app and a deployment whose upstream proxy does not strip X-Forwarded-Host.

Impact

App session cookies are scoped to the wildcard parent domain so the browser attaches them to any app subdomain. An attacker who controls a shared workspace app can serve JavaScript that sends same-site requests with a forged X-Forwarded-Host pointing at a victim's private app. The server routes by the attacker-controlled header but authorizes with the victim's cookie which lets the attacker read the victim's private app responses. Subdomain app routing must be enabled and no upstream proxy may strip X-Forwarded-Host.

Patches

The fix trusts X-Forwarded-Host only from configured trusted proxies and otherwise resolves the routing host from the verified request host.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

| Release line | Patched version |
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |

Workarounds

Place an upstream reverse proxy that strips or overwrites X-Forwarded-Host on untrusted requests.

Resources

  • Fix: #26204

Credits

Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22435) for independently disclosing this issue!

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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